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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~N 1 ~
UNITED HOUSI NG FOUNDATION, INC., ET AL. v.
MILTON FORMAN ET AL.; and
STATE OF NEW YORK AND THE NEW YORK
STATE HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY
v. MILTON FORMAN E'r AL.
ON PETITIONS FOR WRI'rS OF CERTIORARI TO 'l'HE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS .!<'OR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
No:,;, 74-157 and 74-647. Decided January -, 1974

MR JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
These cases involve a question of national importauce
as to the application of the Federal Securities Laws of
1933 and 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 77a et seq.; 78a et seq.
Respondents are tenants of Co-op City, a housing
cooperative in New York City which was built as part
of a s~ate SQonsored pro~am to develop decent living
quarters for low and low-middle-income people. N. Y.
Private Housing Finance Law §§ lP-37. The State subsidizes the building of such cooperatives, places income
limitations on those eligible for tenancy, and provides
preferences for veterans, the aged, and the handicapped.
Petitioner, the United Housing Foundation, is a nonprofit corporation, comprised of labor unions and ciViC
orgamzabons dedicatecl to the development of decent low cost housing, which was chosen as the promoter for
Co-op City. To purchase an apartment a buyer must
pay $450 per room (each room being considered as one
"share") . All
-.. tenants receive one
. _vote
_ in cooperative
matters. If a tenant wants to sell his apartment he
must offer his shares back to thEO cooperative which , to
date, has accepted all such offers. In any event, the
tenant may sell his shares only at the initial purchasmg
price.

-
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Respondents sued in Federal District Court on behalf
of all tenants, alleging that the ''Information Bulletin"
circulated by petitioners to encourage sales in Co-op City
violated the securities laws. 'They requested $30 million
in damages claiming that the Information Bulletin mis..
stated the monthly maintenance charges which proved to ·
be significantly greater than had been estimated.
The District Court held that it was without jurisdiction
to entertain these claims since the securities laws did not
apply to the purchase o~mbershiP," in a housi~g cooperative such as Co-op City. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reversed, finding that petitioners'
denomination of the sale of membership in Co-op City
as "stock" was conclusive for purposes of the securities
laws. The Court also thought that the substance of the
purchase agreement brought it within the intended scope
of the securities laws.'!
The effect of this holding is far reaching. By its terms
the decision applies to hundreds of thousands of government subsidized or supported cooperatives. 2 Its rationale
also plainly covers private cooperatives 3 LJld condomin.:..
iums. Thus, the decision requires application of the
extensive regl1-1atory provisions of the securities laws to
a whole new area of economic activity, and opens the
federal courts to hear grievances that heretofore had been
cognizable, if at all, in state courts.4 For these reasons
alone, I thin~ the decision merits review.
The Court further held that the State of New York and its
Housing Agency were not immune from liability under the Eleventh
Amendment.
2
Petitioners assert, without contradiction, that there are "approximately 100,000 such cooperatives m New York State alone . , ."·
Petn. in No. 74-157, at 13.
3 Th1~ much has already been acknowledged by the Second Circuit
in a subsequent decision, 10/iO TenantB Corp v. Jakobson, 503 F . 2d
1375 (1974) .
4 IndPed, respondents in t his case have included 10 claims under
state law along with their Securities Acts claims, urging the federat
court to hear them uuder the doctriue of pendent jurisdiction,
1

]
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I am further persuaded to this view because the Second
Circuit's opinion reflects a npvel, and in my view, an
erroneous interpretation of the governing law. Relying
on this Court's decisions in SEC v C. M. Joiner Leasing
Co., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943), and Tcherpnin v. Knight,
389 U. ~. 332, 339 (1967), the court held that a literal
interpretation of the ·securities Acts requires their application to this oase since petitioners have labeled the sale
of apartments ai a purchase of "stock." But the Acts
themselves explicitly reject such a wooden approach by
indicating that the iiteral designation controls "unless
the context otherwise requires." 15 U. S. C. § 77b;
§ 78c (a). And the Court's opinions in Joiner and
Tcherpnin make clear that the application of these statutes turns on the economic reality of the transaction and
not the label appended thereto:
"in searching for the rpeaning and scope of the
word 'security' in the Act[s], form should be disregarded for substance and emphasis should be on
economJ!; reality." Tcherpnin, supra, at 336 (empriasis supplied) .5
The Second Circuit, however, went beyond the literal
designation and, applying SEC v. J. W. Howery Co., Inc.,
328 U. S. 2!}3, 298 (1946), concluded that the economic
reallty of the sale of membership in Co-op City was such
as to make the transaction an "investment contract"
within the reach of the securities laws. Howey aeftnes
an "investment contract'' as
"a contract. transaction or scheme whereby a perROll invests his money in a common enterpnse and

--.,.----

L1kewi~e. in Jomer the Court stated that to defiue a "::;ecurity»
a. court must look not only to "what charactt>r the mstrument is
given in commerce by the terms of tht> offer" but also to "the plan
of d1stribut10n, and the economic mducements ht'ld out to the prospect '' 320 U. S., at 852, 353 See also I Loss, Secur1ties Regulation
493 (2d ed. 1961) ("::;uhstance governs rather than form: . . ju::;t
as ;;orne things which look hke real estate are securities, some thmgs
which look like :>f>CI.trities ate real estate.").
5

i
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is lead to expect pro ts solely frorn the efforts of the
promoter or a trd party, .. ." Id., at 298 (emphasis supplied).
The Court of Appeals found that in this case there was
an ~fit from the income that might
result from operation of commercial facilities at Co-op
City. Such facilities are maintained for the convenience
of the cooperative tenants and any profits derived therefrom are applied to the overall operating expenses of the
cooperative. Thus, it was thought that these profits may
broadly be considered "income" to the tenants since
potentially they may reduce the monthly maintenance
charge. 6 This is a strained, even fanciful view of "profits," without support in economic fact or theory and contrary to the assumptions underlying the Securities Acts.
In this case members of Co-op City have not bought
stock or real estate for investment purposes but rather
have purchased living quarters generously subsidized by/
the State of New York. Certainly there was no profit
motive, as no rational person would purchase an apartment in this nonprofit housing co-op as an investment
for profit. Moreover, a tenant takes no risk with respect
to his purchase since, if dissatisfied, he may withdraw
from the cooperative and retrieve his initial investment
in full.
Nor can it even be suggested that the
promoters of the cooperative, including the State of New
Y Ol'k, sold shares in Co-op City as a means of raising
venture capital for a profitmaking operation. Indeed,
the promoter is a nonprofit corporation. Nothing in the
instant transaction partakes of the kind of investment
traditionally found to be within the scope and purpose of
the securities laws.
This view is supported by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the agency charged with administering the
It would follow , presumably, that this reduction in operating
expenses-if in fact it occurs and can be computed-would be taxable income to these heneficia.ries of nonprofit, low-cost housing.
6
'

,

'

I
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securities laws. In a release pertaining to the sales of
conventional residential developments generally, the
Commission ruled that such sales were not within the
Acts unless :
"The offeror is offering an opportunity through
which the purchaser may earn a return on his investments through the managerial efforts of the promoters or a third party . .. " Securities Act Release
No. 33-5347 (1-4-73).
The release further states that "where commercial facilities are a part of a reside~tial project," the Acts do not
apply when :
" (a) the income from such facilities is used only
to offset common area expenses and (b) the operation of such facilities is incidental to the project as
a whole . . . ."
These are precisely the conditions that exist at Co-op
City.
In view of the significance of the issues decided, and
the doubtfulness of the result reached below, I would
grant the writs of certiorari.
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Resps, residents in a cooperative housing development ·

- -

subsidized and regulated by the State of New York in order to provide
low cost housing, brought suit against petr United Housing Foundation
[USF], a non-profit corporation organized by civic groups and labor
unions to provide low cost cooperative housing, and its subsidiad es
in USDC alleging that resps' shares in the co-op const:ituted

-2securities as defined in §3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1~34

[15 U.S.C. §78c(a)] and its counterpart in the Securjties

u.s.c.

Act of 1933 [15

§77b(l)], that the sale of such shares to

them by petr and its subsidiaries violated §17 of the 1933 Act
and §lO(b) of the 1934 because of failures to disclose.

They

also alleged 10 state law claims under pendent jurisdiction.

The

USDC dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the resp residents'
shares were not securities within the 1933 and 1934 Acts.

The

Second Circuit reversed holding that the shares did constitute
securities as defined
\ on the merits.

~n th~cts

and remanded the case for a trial

Petrs now seek cert to review the CA judgment

arguing that the co-op shares were not §3(a) (10) securities.
Facts:

Resps are residents of Co-op City, the largest co-

operative housing project in the United States, which was organized
by petr in 1951 in order to provide inexpensive housing for low
and middle income families.

The project was financed and regulated

by the New York State Housing Authority . pursuant to New York's
Mitchell-Lama Act providing for state aid to mutual companies formed
for the purpose of managing co-ops on a non-profjt basis, whose
shares are wholly owned by the actual tenants of the co-op and
transferable only back to the mutual company upon leavjng the
project.

There are income limitations on those who may live in

the project and preferences to certain disadvantaged groups.

:

-3If a tenant is accepted for occupancy in one of the co-op areas,
he purchases $425 worth of mutual company shares for each room in the
apartment that he will occupy.

However, each tenant gets only one

v ote in the company no matter how many shares he holds.

The shares

cannot be owned apart from actual occupancy in the co-op nor may

--------------.

·t hey be
pledged, encumbered or transferred in any way save by
I
r epurcha s e by the mutual company for the same amount paid when the
t enant l e aves the project either voluntarily or for breach of his
The shares pay no dividends and confer no value except for

. \ l ease.

t he right to occupancy under the terms of a standardized lease, the
r ight to an equal voice in the non-profit mutual company's

-

management of the project, and the right to redemption upon departure
at the purchase price.

The carrying charges or monthly rentals under the lease vary
depending on expenses incurred by the mutual company in its
management of the project (e.g. the carrying charges on the
construct i on mortgage and maintenance/repair costs) and income
realized by the company from such activities as parking fees and
renting certain areas for shops.

The tenants can deduct interest

paid by the company on the mortgage under certain IRC provisions
designed to extend this benefit of home ownership to co-op residents.
The gravamen of the resps' complaint in this case is that an
information bulletin given to them at the time that they signed
share subscription agreements for shares in the under-construction
co-op failed to adequately disclose that increases in construction

' '
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costs of the co-op and increases in interest rates could result
i n an increase in estimated monthly carrying charges or rental
·------------------------------------~----~--~----~~
and that as, a result of such factors, rentals did in fact increase
f rom $23/month to $39/month per room.

Resps, filing in behalf of

all similarly situated tenants, therefore claim in excess of $30
million in damages from various eleemosynary

institutions.

Section 3{a) (10) of the 1934 Act provides that:
" When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise
requires -- • • • •
(10) The term 'security' means any
note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate
of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty orlease,
collateral trust certificate, pre-organization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting trust certificate, certificate ofdeposit ·
for a security, or in general, any instrument commonly
known as a security. • • • "

an:Y

Contention:

The sole question
presented by this petition is
_,..,.,. _,.
~

whe ther the bundle of rights encompassed by the co-op shares
constituted a "security" within the meaning of the above cited
----

. :w=::=

sec tion.!/ Petr argues that this is the first decision in the
h istory of these acts extending them to the purchase and sale of
residences, citing the widespread criticism of the decision by the
~

securities bar and others [Pet. at 13] and states that it extends
the acts to the sale of several million condominium and cooperatjve

!/The definition of "security" under the 1933 Act [15 u.s.c. §77 (b) (1)]
is almost identical and has been construed as being interchangeable wi t h
the above section. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-336.

-'5-

units each year, many of which are publically financed and regulated.
It adds the intricate and expensive web of federal securities
regulation, designed in the 1930's for regulation of major money
markets, to already extensive state regulation of this area which
is peculiarly unsuited to application of existent federal securjties
laws.

It frustrates state regulation of the area, allows forum

sho~ng

in violation of Erie, creates uncertainty as to whether

registration of such sales is required and, for example, eliminates
the practice of arbitration of disputes arising in connection with
sales of such units since violations of the federal security laws
a re not subject to mandatory arbitration provisions.

Wilko v.

Swan, 346 U.S. 427.
Although the co-op shares sold were denominated "stock" and
§3 (a) (10) includes in its definition of a security "stock", the

-,1111s·
T

literal reading given the statute by the CA was error.

~s

'

The statute

)

+kt~) specifically states ". • • unless the context otherwise requires.

+ke- ·,• ~+-4-+
of and

h

.
1. t
d
.
d. ff
t
d.
ere econom1c rea 1 y oes requ1re a 1 eren rea 1ng.

~ s~+.
. ) Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra.

~o+ the-

II

The legislative history of the Acts

shows that they were not intended to apply to the sale of residences
especially where such sales were regulated and financed by the states
themselves.
decisions.

The literalist approach has been rejected by two CA
Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3rd Cir. 1973);

McClure v. First National Bank of Lubbock, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cjr.
1974).

TheCA's application of the Howey test (SEC v.

w.

J. Howey,

328 U.S. 293, 298-299] to find the shares an investment contract
and hence within §3(a) {10) was error.

Howey requires that the

investor be led to expect profits from the efforts of a third
party as does SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320
352.

u.s.

344,

This element of the test has been restated many times.

In

the immediate case, there is no profit in any conventional sense
since the shares are redeemed at a fixed price and the CA decision
which found "profit" in reduced rentals and federal tax benefits
was simply error.
The decision of the CA is in direct conflict with the position
of the SEC as expressed in Securities Act Release No. 33-5347 [pet.
at D5] which exempts cooperatives such as that in issue from
registration requirements on the grounds that they are not a security.
The USDC opinion repeated many of the above arguments of petr
and was grounded on a finding that Howey was not met since from an
examination of all relevant circumstances the USDC concluded that
the resp residents did not invest with an expectation of profit.
The CA opinion was bottomed on a two-fold analysis.

First,

instruments denominated as one of the categories enumerated in
the statute are a security.

Stock is an enumerated category and

these shares were called stock.

"Instruments may be included

within any of these definitions, as a matter of law, if on their
face they answer to the name or description.

II

SEC v.

-7-

c.

M. Joiner Leasing Corp., supra at 351.

supra at 339.

Tcherepnin v. Knight,

Second, the shares constituted an investment

contract under Howey since there was an expectation of profit by
t he investor -- such profit being in the form of reduced rentals
and tax benefits.
Resps generally repeats the CA reasoning and argues that "profit"
a s used in the Howey test requires only the expectation of economic
benefit and not a direct return in the form of a capital gain on
s ale or dividends or other conventional payment as petr implies.

He

a rgues that the SEC's exemption of cooperative unit sales from
r egistration in SEC Rule 235 shows that the SEC regards such units
a s securities since it wouldn't otherwise be necessary to exempt
them.
Discussion:

Inasmuch as the decision below stands on the

l iteralist view of §3(a) (10) that because the shares were denominated
" stock")

they were within the statute, it isn't particularly novel

and reflects the widespread interpretation of

c.

M. Joiner's dicta.

As evidenced by the cited CA opinions, the literalist view is under
some attack in this

are~·

paralleling the subjective move under

Section 16 (b) ·because of the irrational results it produces.

It

j

s

difficult to justify the notion that because the tenant's rights were
labeled "stock" rather than a membership they were subject to an
entire body of regulatory legislation designed for the protection
of major money markets and not residence sales.

It would be possible

-8to distinguish Joiner on the grounds suggested by petr.
The alternate grounds for theCA's holding (that Howey was
satisfied by the expectation of "profit" in the form of tax
savings and lower rent) would simply make any form of investment
a "security" subject to federal regulation and certainly would
reach all condominium and cooperative sales in the United States.
If the federal security laws are other than a regulation of all
not expressly exempt commercial transactions, then the holding
that "profit" as used in Howey means expectation of economic
benefit is wrong.
This petition seeks

review of an interlocutory CA judgement

-----~

so that petitioner carries a laboring oar in convincing the Court
that the questions presented are fundamental to resolution of the
.
.
.
y
case an d o f extr·1ns1.c
1.mportance.

. '1 ar petJ.t1.on
.
A somew h at SJ.m1.
present-

ing the question of §3{a) (10) 's reach was presented in Equity Securitjes
Corp. v. El Khadem, No. 74-46; was on the discuss list for the October
7 conference; and has not yet been disposed of.

This case would not

be an appropriate hold for Equity (if that petition is granted)
given the alternate holdings here and the somewhat different facts
presented.

YR.

Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice §4.19 at 180-81
(4th ed. 1969).

-9Cert should be granted in the instant case only if the Court
i s willing to modify the literalist view of §3(a) (10) expressed j n
Joiner.
There is a response.
O'Neill

10/15/74
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

January 16, 1975

Re:

Nos. 74-157 and 74-747 -United Housing Foundation,
et al. v. Forman, et al.

Dear Lewis:
Your opinion dissenting from denial of certiorari in
these cases has persuaded me to change my vote and I will
vote to grant certiorari. I will not, however, break my
sacred tradition of not dissenting from denial.
Sincerely,

~
Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~mtt ~(tltri 41f

tlrt ~ttittb .itaftg

Jl'uJrington. ~. ~· 2llgi.l!~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

January 16, 1974

Re: No. 74-157 No. 74-647 -

United Housing Foundation, Inc.
v. Forman
New York v. Forman

Dear Lewis:
Please join me in your dissent from the anticipated
denial of certiorari in these cases.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
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The Conference
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No. 74-157

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Joel Klein

DATE:

April 14, 1975

No. 74-157, New York, et al. v. Forman
In view of your position, as expressed in the proposed
dissent from denial that we prepared, I feel quite assured that
we will not have to address the innnunity issue raised by the
state petitioners in this case.

If, for some reason, however,

you are required to express your views on that issue I would
find that there is no innnunity here, either for the State of
New York or its Housing Agency.

I will briefly outline my

views.
1.

With respect to the State itself, the New York

statutes, referring to the present housing laws, provides:
'~ith regard to
arising out of this
commissioner or the
be sued in the same

duties and liabilities
article the state, the
supervisory agency may
manner as a private person."

This is, I would assume, an explicit waiver of innnunity
applicable to the State.

New York's argument, that this

provision does not waive innnunity in federal court, is hollow.
Nothing in the statute suggests this distinction. *

Indeed, if

"I<
In other statutes, the New York legislature has
made clear that it intended only a limited waiver of innnunity.

2.

a private person can be sued in federal court, as CA 2 erroneously
held, then the State can be so sued.
2.

This explicit waiver provision does not apply to

petitioner, the State Housing Finance Agency since it is not
a "supervising agency" as required by the statute.

Nevertheless,

as petitioner virtually concedes, this Agency is wholly distinct
from the state.

By statute, the state is exempted from liability

for the debts of the Agency.

In this situation the Agency is

not protected by the Eleventh Amendment.
3.

Since the first two points would resolve the

Lmmunity issue in this case, I would certainly avoid the
alternative ground relied on by CA 2 below, since I think it
raises difficult and confusing issues.

The alternative ground

is that states which sell securities after the passage of the
1933 and 1934 Acts are liable to suit on the theory that they
have implicitly consented to Congressional abrogation of
Lmmunity since the Securities Acts apply against the States.
In essence this question boils down to whether Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S . 651 cuts back on Parden v. Terminal R. of Ala.,
377 U.S. 184.

It would seem that Edelman probably does erode

somewhat the holding in Parden but I would hardly decide that
issue here; rather I would wait for a case in which I thought
the Securities Act did apply to the stocks at issue, and then
decide whether those Acts intended to abrogate state Lmmunity .
JK
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April 22, 1975

No. 74-157

N.Y. v. Foreman

Characteristics of Common Stock

1.

Transferability - must offer back to co-op.

2.

Voting Rights - here each Tenant had one vote regard-

less of number of shares (one share for each room).

3.

Opportunity to Profit - Tenant may not profit, as

must sell only at initial purchasing

4.

price. ~d~~i1~Ai~~

A stock corporation by definition is different from (St:c...,q·B~

a nonstock-nonprofit corporation.

How could a member of a

nonprofit corporation profit, if corporation is not allowed
to make any profits.

(Joel - What about farm, milk and

rurual electric co - ops).

5.

Dividends - none.

(Reduction in operating expenses is not a profit.
tax is paid on this.

If fuel costs went down, and operating

costs decreased, would there be a profit?)

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

No

April 22, 1975

No. 74-157 New York v. Foreman
As described by the District Court, the central facts
in this case include:
The project, Coop City, was authorized by New York's
Mitchell-Lamar Act designed to provide housing for low-income
fami lies.

Pursuant to the Act, the defendant New York State

Housing Finance Agency (the Agency) provides subsidized
mortgaged financing; another defendant, New York State
Division of Housing and Community Renewal (the State Division)
is responsible under New York law for the construction and
operation of the project.

United Housing Foundation (UHF)

initiated and sponsored Coop City.

It is a nonprofit,

charitable corporation (see charter) comprised of housing
cooperatives, civic groups . and labor unions.
River Bay Corporation (River Bay) is the cooperative
housing corporation in which these plaintiffs purchased shares,
and which owns and operates Coop City.
under the Mitchell-Lamar Act.

River Bay was organized

By virtue of that Act and the

chart er of the corporation, it shares of "stock" have the
following unique characteristics:
1.

The shares are tied to rooms in apartments at the

rate of $450 per room - 18 shares at $25 per share entitled
the purchaser to one room.
2.

May not be pledged or otherwise encumbered.

2.
3.

May not be inherited except by a surviving spouse

(who would have the right to occupancy).
4.

The stock purchase transaction is rescindable by

either party.
5.

The shares may not be owned separate and apart from

actual occpancy in Coop City.
6.

If the tenant leaves Coop City, he is required to

divest himself of the stock:

Offering it first to the

corporation for repurchase at the exact.*
7.

Voting rights are limited to one vote per apartment,

regardless of the number of the shares.
8.

No dividends.

9.

No opportunity to make a profit. The charter, pursuant

to New York law, provides expressly that shares may be sold
only at the initial purchase price.

*In the unlikely event that the corporation does not repurchase
the shares, the owner may sell them elsewhere but only at the
original purchase price, plus a fraction of the mortgage
amortization which he paid during his tenure at Coop City.
The coop has a reserve fund (totaling some $900,000 at Dec.
31, 1972) for repurchase purposes - a reserve not needed
because several thousand families are on the waiting list for
apartments, and the turnover is slight.
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regardless of the number of the shares.
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to New York law, provides expressly that shares may be sold
only at the initial purchase price.

*in the unlikely event that the corporation does not repurchase
the shares, the owner may sell them elsewhere but only at the
original purchase price, plus a fraction of the mortgage
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The coop has a reserve fund (totaling some $900,000 at Dec.
31, 1972) for returchase purposes - a reserve not needed
because several thousand families are on the waiting list for
apartments, and the turnover is slight.
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MEMORANDUM

DATE:

TO:

Mr. Joel Klein

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
"7'( ~I .r7
No. 7-•!1 United Housing

May 26, 1975

I deliver back to you herewith the draft of May 9, which
I have reviewed carefully.
It is totally convincing (at least to me), and well organized
and drafted.

l

have, as usual, made a number of editing changes

to reflect my own taste and style.
In aclil1tion, I have suggested revisions of certain portions
by dictating riders which are attached.
All of my changes are subject, of course, to further discussion.

After you have reviewed them, I suggest we talk

about any points or changes which you think should be
discussed.
Then, let's get a chambers copy printed promptly.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

,.

Qfourl .ltf ttr~ ~b ~fa:Ug
._.asltingflm. ~. <!f. 21l.;i~~ ·

~tmt

CHAMBERS OF

,JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

June 2, 1975

Re:

No. 74-157 - United Housing Foundation v. Forman
No. 74-647 - New York v. Forman

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell

cc:

The Conference

.iu:pumt <!J~urt ~f tqt 'Jifuitt~ .iWtg

Jfagqmghm. ~. <!J.

2ll~J!.~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN , JR.

June 2, 1975

RE: Nos. 74-157 & 74-647 - United Housing Foundation
& State of N.Y. and N.Y. State Housing, etc. v.
Milton Forman et al.

Dear Lewis:
In due course I shall circulate a dissent in the
above .
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

~u.prtmt

<!fo-nrl o-f tlrt ~ta ~tatts
-as!p:ngton. ~. <!f. 2llgt,.~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 2, 1975

Re:

Nos. 74-157 and 74-647 - United Housing v. Forman

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely~

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

-

.juprmu <!fcu.ri cf t!rt~~ ,jb.tftg
Jl'Mlfi:ngLm, ~. <!f. 2llgl)!~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 2, 1975

Re: Nos. 74-157, United Housing Fd., Inc.
and 74-647, New York v. Forman
Dear Lewis,
I am glad to join your opinion for
the Court in these cases.
Sincerely yours,

(/(1
I

I

/
Mr. Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

:J

I

/

.ju:vrtntt <!}llltrt cf tlr~ ~b .jtaftg
'IJM~tt, ~.

<!}. 2ll,?'!.;l

CHAMBERS OF

June 2. 197 5

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

No. 74-157 --United Housing Foundation. Inc. v.
Milton Forman
74-647 -- State of New York and the New York State
Housing Finance Agency v. Milton Forman

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely.

T.M.
Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

,jttpt"tmt <!fond of tlft ~tb ,jtatts
Jfaslfi:ttgron. ~. <!f. 21l&iJI.~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 3, 1975

Re: Nos. 74-157 & 74-647 - United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman
Dear Lewis:
I shall await Bill Brennan's dissent.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to Conference

,jUFttttt <q~ of tJrt J'nifta ,jmttg
Jfasfti:nghtn. ~. <q. 20p'!$

/

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 6, 1975

Re:

74-157 - United Housing Foundation v. Forman
74-647 - State of New York v. Forman

Dear Lewis:
I join you.
Regards,

Lvtr:>

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
P. S. (LFP only)
This is an excellent job and I particularly welcome the
addition of note 15 ~

'

nvr rrr l!fVl

').11n t:~l1in ~'ttm.

' rrr tmrr- ,.. nnr:
!D. <q. 2tlJ>1·;3
I

CHA~.o10CJ1G

j

Of

JUSTICE BYRON R WI-'ITE

J une 10, 1975

Re:

Nos. 74-157 & 74-647 -United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman

Dear Bill:
Please add my name to your dissenting
o pinion in these cases.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to Conference

.;§ttpumt <G"ottd of tire- 2Jlttitt1t .:%fr~fl's
~aulyington, gl. <!f. 20pJ!,~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS

Re:

June 11, 1975

United Housing Foundation v. Forman, No. 74-157
State of New York v. Forman, No. 74-647

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your dissenting opinion.
Sincerely,

WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS
Mr. Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference

June 11, 1975

No. 74-157

United Housing v. Forman

No. 74-647

New York v. Forman

Dear Mr. Putzel:

Tbe line-up in the above case is as follows:
Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Burger,

c. J. ,

Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun and

Rehnquiat, JJ., joined.

Brennan, J., filed a dissenting

opinion, in which Douglas and White, JJ., joined.
Sincerely,

Mr. Henry Putzel, jr.

lfp/aa
cc:

Mr. Comio

-.

. .,

lfp/ss

6/13/75

United Housing

This case, here on certiorari to the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, involves a large
cooperative housing project in New York known as Co-Op
City.

This nonprofit project was financed and

constructed under a New York Law designed to provide
low-cost cooperative housing for low income tenants.
The project was heavily subsidized by long-term, lowinterest mortgage loans and tax exemptions.
Co-Op City solicited prospective tenants by an
Information Bulletin which described the project, and
included estimates of construction costs and monthly
rental charges.

To acquire an apartment, the prospective

tenant had to buy prescribed shares of stock in the
project.
Construction costs greatly exceeded estimates,
resulting in substantial increases in the rental charges.
The plaintiffs in this suit are tenants who claim that
the Information Bulletin contained false and misleading
statements.

The defendants are the various parties that

sponsored, constructed and now operate the project.

··.

..,.

2.
Suit was brought in the federal court on the
theory that sale of the shares was subject to the
anti-fraud provisions of the federal Securities Acts.
The sole issue in this case is whether these shares
constitute securities within the meaning of the federal
Acts.
The shares at issue cannot be transferred to a
non-tenant; they cannot be bequeathed except to a
surviving spouse; they cannot be encumbered; and voting
rights are limited to one vote per apartment.

More

important, there can be no capital appreciation on the
shares, and they carry no dividend rights.
Plaintiffs, nevertheless, contend that profits
may be derived indirectly in terms of low-cost housing,
possible reduction in rental charges from the operation
of shops and services within the co-op, and from certain
tax benefits.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the plaintiffs,
and held that these shares are securities within
the meaning of the federal Acts .

..

~

3~

We t ake a different view.

The plaintiffs were

not investing in stock with the view to making a
profit thereon; they were acquiring the right to occupy
housing on exceptionally favorable terms.

These shares

possessed none of the characteristics of instruments
commonly known as securities.

Accordingly, we concluded

that they are not within the purview of the federal
Securities Acts, and we reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.

Mr. Justice Brennan has filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice White
have joined.

)
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·. Notto :Be Securities
By Margaret Gentry
Associated Press

The Supreme Court 'yesterday refused to extend the
protection of .the federal securitiesbws to )lundreds of
thousands of owners of cooperative apartments.
In a 6-to-3' decision, the
court ruled that stock ,purchased in cooperative housing projects dods not qualify
as a security subject to federal regulation.
The decision reversed a
U.S. circuit court ruling in a
case involving the 50,000
tenants of Co-Op City in
The Bronx, N.Y., the 'largest
housing cooperative in the
nation. ·. ·
/
The appellate ,·court ·in
New , York. ' had ruled tha~
federai' · regulations apply,
;partly because tenants pur. chased what was called
· stpck.
. .
Writing · for the Supreme
qourt' . majority, . _Justice
Lewis . F. Powell said that
' \ '
·,
'

1

calling something stock does
not make it so.
· The ownership shares purchased by the tenants offcred no prospect of profit
and have none <Jf the other
features common to securities laws, Powell said.
\The Co-Op City residents
filed the class action suit to
· challenge increases in ·their
monthly maintenance costs.
They argued that the -project sponsors, United Housing Foundation, and its operating arm, Riverbay, were
bound by a 1965 information
bulletin which said the aver; .
age :q1onthly cost would be
about $92 for a four-room
apartment.
,
: , ;, ,
· ~ By' July 1974, the 'average
monthly rate Qlad t exceeded
$156 for the same space.
The Co-Op City residents
argued that the 1965 prediction amounted to a solicita• tion to buy stock and that
the project operators were
, bound by i~ by tederal secu- .
rities law. . .
,
If that position lh ad pre- ,
vailed, it' could have set' oft
similar suit's .,to force rental
reductions in many other cooperative · housing projects
across the, country~ : .. u'r
) ucommon ° sense suggests '
that people who intended to
· -acq\1ir~ . ortly _a residenti~l
apartll),ent in ·_,.a state-sub~I
dized c'oopera~ve for their .
·personal use are not' likely
· to believe that; in reality '
they are •purchasing ·invest- ·
. ment securities 1-,simply be, ,
cause the transaction is evi-·
denc~d by something called
a share of .stoc~," · Powell '
wrote.

. . ·

w

~·

•

....

.••

'

De's pite the name, .he continued,•shares in' Co-Op City '
lack ·~the mos-t common . feature · of stock," '' the ,right to ·.
receive dividends from · the
company's pr'Ofits. ·
·
"In short, the. inducemen.t ·
to purchase was solely. .to ac- ;
quire ., subidized low-cost 'liv· 1
· ing sp'ace; it was :not to in-vest for profit," .he COl}·
eluded.

--=-

Co-Op.9ity.:T ~rr.ants Lose
High Cqu.~tPlea. o.n,. Cos. ts
Spec!&! to The New Yon Tlmu

•'•·WASHINGTON, June 16-The Supreme Court ruled today that stqc~ purchased by prospective tenants in coope·rative ho~sing projectJs to ,qualify for apartments was not sub, ject to Federal regulation that •,. · · -- · · .. · · ..
1 ,might!hav~ held monthly car: rying !charges down to originally ~dvertised· figures. ,· .j ,,
;oi~ding 6 to' 'a, the justices· .
held that' 50,000 tenants of· Cor ·
Op; C.iW ·in the Bronx, the larg- '
'est copper&tive in the ,country,
were ·not entitled · to Federal
court trial of their request· foP :
a banr_on many ·of their 1 0arry~ 1
ing-charge increases above the i
1965level. They had also sought i
more than $30-milli!)n . in dam: J
ages1
.• ; ·'
' ~d the · .high . ,court . decided
otlierwfse, ,. htinr:i'reds' of 'thou:·
SiallldS: of other ten~nts \across
the COUntry: iri cooperatives and
perhaps in condominiums, might
have been able to hold the de:velopers of these projects . to
their original' estimates of
monthly carrying charges, in•
' dependent of subsequent co.n, struction-cost inflation.
I ' In concluding that sh4res · ~
. a cooperative are not'stock sub, joct to Federal regulations, the
' majority rejected the views of
: the Securities ·and 1 Excpange
· 'Commission and the . United
i Court of Appeals for the.Second
: Circuit.
,
· The Supreme \ Court majority ·,
t left ope]. the possibility· that l
' Co-Op City' ten~ts·, might be ·.
· able to pursue' their claims .of
Continued on Page :.l2, Column'

TENANTS OF CO-OP
l LOSE COSTS SUIT
n Con~inued

From Page 1,

Col.~&

fraud in the state courts.
f Associate Justice ,Willi~ J .
.• Brennan Jr. maintained for the
1 minority that stock bought by
.e cooperative tenants represented
:- "securities"· subject to Federal
.
-.
'· oversight because it was 'called _Federal District .c~urt dts-~.
d. "
k"
d ·
d
"' nssed the . lawsUirt: on the
e stoc
an -mvo1ve an In·round tha:t cooperative shares
e vestment contract" from which1ere not stock. But the Court
~ the tenants might profit inf Appeals reversed, · holdi_ng
various ways.
~at the tenants had been m, Joining in the dissent were;olved in- an investment con- 1
t Associate Justices William o.ract whe~ they bought ~e .
·
.
hares w1th "an expectation
r Douglas and Byron R. W?tte. ~ pr~fits" in terms of .low
. To get an apartment m the ·ousing costs, tax deductiOns
' state-aided, nonprofit Co-Op 1 the ~nterest and realty-tax
City project, which opened in art !Of ~eir carrying char_ges,
1968 a tenant had to buy 18 nd po-ss1ble rent reducttons
shar~s of $25 stock for each esulting. from i~come from
ommerc1al franch1ses -at Co-Op
th f
room, or $1,800 wor
or a1ity
Majority yiew
·
four-ro?m apartm'ent. In a ~ir· f '
cular m 1965, the operatmg Associate Justtce Le~s F.
corporation said the averagePowell Jr. wrote for the mHjormonthly carrying charge wouldity today -t hat "there can be
then be $23 a room. .
·
~o doubt that investors 'were
The stodk requirement re"llttracte~ ~olely by the pros~ct
.
of acqumng a place to hve
roamed steady, but the monthlymd no& by f.inancial returns
carrying charge, with inflation 0n their investment."
driving up construction costst Franchise income, from store
by $125-inillion rose to m01·e~nd office rental and parking
than $40 a roo~ by 1974, and~_arages ~as "far ~o~, speculath te ants filed suit in Federalpve andmsubstantlal to m~ke
· _e . n
to-Op C1ty shares an ·attractive
D1stnct Court.
Investment such as common
: " The~, con ten de~ that their stock, the majority declared.
. stock w_a:; no different from Such cooperative stock, Justhe secunt1es traded on ex·uce Powell noted, does not
cha~ges - across the co~:~ntry 'give purchasers the night to
and that they had been m1sled,:lividends based on profit is
in violation of · S.E.C. regula- ,
'
tions as to their prospective '
monthly charges. They also
contended that operators of the
project had withheld several
· important financial facts from
: the beginnil)g.
· The• suit did not challenge
those .increases in carryingi===::;::=======-~charges resulting from ·rising
,
maintenance and operating not negotiable, cannot bel
~osts. 1t challenges only those pledged against a debt and
mcreases t~a~ . resulted from ~he cannot appreciate in value un·
-~ th
sharply nsmg constructiOn d th t
costs while the 35-building, er e erms v•
e purchase
300-acre project went up be- contr-act.
tween 1'965 and 1972. The orig- · "What distinguishes a securi·
ina! cost estimate was about ty transaction and what is ab·
$280-million; · the final cost was sent here," the majority said,
more than $420-million.
"•is an investment where one
Currently the Co-op City parts wi-th his money in the
residents are being asked to hope of I'eceiving profits from
pay 25 per cent increase in the efforts · of others and not
carrying charges, . stemming where he purcha·ses a ·commodi·
from rising operating and main- ty for personal consumption
tenance ·costs, state of(icials or living quarters for pel1Sonal
say. This .r equest lias led to a use."
•
1
withholdil'lg of carrying charges Ju·stice Powell said the rna·
and a stat~ take-over . . of the jority gave ~·no special weight'~
management of 'the project.
to the Securities and Exchange
Prominent Counsel
Commiss-ion's contention, an·
The Federal ·suit pitted two nounced in the case only this
prominent lawyers ~gainst each yea·r that cooperabive stock
?th,~r-Louis Nizer for the su- was ',a federally regulatable se·
mg cooperator~. and f?rf!ler curity, since the agency had
' Federal Jud~e S1mon H. R1fkmd taken the opposi-te position in
for the proJect's sponsor, the a policy statement in 1973.
United Housing Foundation, 1
and its builder, Community · ---· "'"~~w CAMP. KIDS.
Services, Inc.

June 16, 1975

case Held for No. 74-647, New York v. Forman
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

No. 74-1190 MacKethan v. Virginia
I will vote to deny this petition. The basic issue is
whether a state can be held liable under the federal Securities
Acts for activities that it undertakes while regulating a
savings and loan institution. USDC and CA4 found the action
barred by the Eleventh ~mendment. Although a vaguely similar
issue was presented in the state's petition in Forman, our
disposition there made it unnecessary to consider the immunity
question.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

July 9, 1975

No. 74-157, United Housing v. Forman
MEMORANDUM TO MR. PUTZEL

Although the change from "purchasers" etc.
to "tenants' may clarify things, on balance I
think the present arrangement is preferable.
Joel Klein

LFP/gg ·

~
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Respondents are referred to herein variously as

"purchasers", "owners", or

11

tenants".

Respondents do not

hold legal title to their respective apartments, but they are
purchasers and owners of the shares of Riverbay which entitle
them to occupy the apartments.

By virtue of their right

of occupancy, Respondents are usually described as tenants .

.
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LFP/gg

4.

Respondents are referred to herein variously

as "purchasers", "owners", or "tenants".

Respondents

do not bold legal title to their respective apartments,
but they are purchasers and owners of the shares of
Riverbay which entitle them to occupy the apartments.
By virtue of their right of occupancy, Respondents are
usually described as tenants.
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July 14, 1975

Memorandum to Mr. Putzel:
l'

Please insert this footnote at page 3, first
paragraph, line 2, and renumber the following footnotes,
including the infra and supra cites.
Joel Klein
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CHAMBERS DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 74-157

AND

74-647

United Housing Foundation, Inc., et al.,
Petitioners,
74-157
v.
Milton Forman et al.

On Writs of Certiorari to the
United States Court of
State of New York and the
Appeals for the Second
New York State HousCircuit.
ing Finance Agency,
Petitioners,
v.
.74-647
Milton Forman et al.
[June -, 1975]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
'Court.
The issue in this case is whether shares of stock entitling a purchaser to lease an apartment in Co-Op City,
a state subsidized and supervised nonprofit housing cooperative, are "securities" within the purview of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.
I
Co-Op City is a massive housing cooperative in New
York City. Built between 1965 and 1971, it presently
houses approximately 50,000 people on a 200-acre site
containing 35 high rise buildings and 236 town houses.
The project was organized, financed, and constructed
under the New York State Private Housing Finance Law,

74-157 & 74-647-0PINION
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commonly known as the Mitchell-Lama Act, enacted to
ameliorate a perceived crisis in the availability of decent
low income urban housing. In order to encourage private developers to build low cost cooperative housing,
New York provides these developers with large long-term,
low-interest mortgage loans and substantial tax exemptions. Receipt of such benefits is conditioned on a willingness to have the State review virtually every step in
the development of the cooperative. See N. Y. Private
Housing Finance Law §§ 11-40, as amended (McKinney
Supp. 1974- 1975). The developer also must operate the
facility strictly "on a nonprofit basis," id., at§ 11-a (2a),
and he may lease apartments only to people below a
certain income level and who have been approved by the
State.1
The United Housing Foundation (UHF), a nonprofit
membership corporation established for the purpose of
"aiding and encouraging" the creation of "adequate, safe
and sanitary housing accommodations for wage earners
al).d other persons of low and moderate income," 2 Appenp.ix, at 95a, was responsible for initiating and sponsoring
the development of Co-Op City. Acting under the
Mitchell-Lama Act, UHF organized the Riverbay Corporation (Riverbay) to own and operate the land and
buildings comprising Co-Op City. Riverbay, a nonprofit cooperative housing corporation/\issued the stock
which is the subject of this litigation/ UHF also con1 Eligibility is limited to families whose monthly income does not
exceed six times the monthly rental charge (or, for famili es of four
or more, seven times the rental charge). N. Y. Private Housing
Finance Law § 31 (2) (a) (McKinney Supp. 1974--1975). Preference
in admission must be given to veterans, handicapped people and
the elderly. !d., at§ 31 (7)-(9).
2 UHF is comprised of labor unions, housing cooperatives and
civic groups. It has sponsored the building of several major housing
cooperatives in New York City.

I
v
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tracted with Community Services, Inc. (CSI), its wholly
owned subsidiary, to become the general contractor and
·sales agent for the project. 3 As required by the Mitchell~
Lama Act, these decisions were approved by the State
Housing Commissioner.
To acquire an apartment in Co-Op City a prospective
purchaser, assuming he meets the eligibility requirements
and is approved by the State, is required to buy 18 shares
of stock in Riverbay for each room desired. The cost
per share is $25, making the total cost $450 per room, or
, $1,800 for a four-room apartment. The sole purpose of
acquiring these shares is to enable the purchaser to
occupy an apartment ,in Co-Op City; in effect, their
purchase is a recoveraple deposit on an apartment. The
shares are explicitly ,;tied to the apartment: they cannot
be transferred to a nontenant; nor can they be pledged
or encumbered; a a they descend, along with the apartment, only to a rv1vmg spouse. No votin ri hts attach to the sha es as such;
in,(a;ffiilrs of the
cooperative ap ertains to the apartment, each tenant
being1 entitled o one vote irrespective of the number of
sha es he own .

3 CSI is a business corporation that has acted as the contractor
on several UHF -sponsored housing cooperatives.
4 A tenant can be forced to move out if he violates the provis~ons
of his "occupancy agreement," which is essentially a lease for the
apartment, or if his income grows to exceed the eligibility standards.
5 To date every family that has moved out of Co-Op City has
received back its initial payment in full. Indeed, at the time this
suit was filed there were 7,000 families on the waiting list for apartments in this cooperative. In addition, a special fund of nearly

74-157 & 74-647-0PINION
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the initial purchase price plus a fraction of the mortgage
that he has paid off, and then only to a prospective tenant
satisfying the statutory income eligibility requirements.
See N. Y. Private Housing Finance Law § 31-a (McKinney Supp. 1974-1975).
In May 1965, subsequent to the completion of the
initial planning, Riverbay circulated an Information
Bulletin seeking to attract tenants for what would someday be apartments in Co-Op City. After describing the
nature and advantages of cooperative housing generally
and Co-Op City in particular, the Bulletin informed prospective tenants that the total estimated cost of the project, based largely on an anticipated construction contract
with CSI, was $283,695,550. Only a fraction of this
sum, $32,795,550, was to come from the purchase of
shares by tenants. The remaining $250,900,000 was to
be financed by a 40-year low-interest mortgage loan from
the New York Private Housing Finance Agency. After
the project was built, the setvicing of the mortgage and
current operating expenses would be defrayed from
monthly rental charges paid by the tenants. While
these rental charges were to vary, depending on the size,
nature, and location of an apartment, the 1965 Bulletin
estimated that the "average" monthly cost would be
$23.02 per room, or $92.08 for a four-room apartment.'
Several times during the construction of Co-Op City,
Riverbay, with the approval of the State Housing Com_missioner, revised its contract with CSI by allowing for
increased construction costs. In addition, Riverbay also
incurred other expenses that had not been reflected in the
1965 Bulletin. To meet these increased expenditures,
Riverbay, with the Commissioner's approval, repeatedly
$1 million had been established by small monthy contributions from
nil tenants to insure that those who wanted to sell their apartments
would be able to do so.

74-157 & 74-647-0PINION
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secured increased mortgage loans from the State Housing
Agency. Ultimately the construction loan was $125
million more than the figure estimated in the 1965 Bulletin. As a result, while the initial purchasing price
remained at $450 per room, the average monthly carrying charges were increased periodically, reaching a figure
of $39.68 per room as of July 1974.6
These increases in the rental charges precipitated the
present lawsuit. Respondents, 57 residents of Co-Op
City, sued in federal court on behalf of all 15,372 apartment owners, and derivatively on behalf of Riverbay,
seeking upwards of $30 million in monetary damages,
forced rental reductions and other "appropriate" relief.
Named as defendants (petitioners herein) were UHF,
CSI, Riverbay, several individual directors of these organizations, the State of New York, and the State Private
Housing Finance Agency. The heart of respondents'
claim was that the 1965 Co-Op City Information Bulletin
falsely represented that CSI would bear all subsequent
cost increases due to"unanticipated facto'rs such as inflation. Respondents further alleged that they were misled
in their purchases of shares since the Information Bulletin failed to disclose several critical facts. 7 On these
6 As the rental charges increased, the income eligibility requirements for residents of Co-Op City expanded accordingly. See n. 1,

sup.ra.
7
Respondents maintained that the following material facts were
omitted: (i) the original estimated cost had never been adhered to
in any of the previous Mitchell-Lama projects sponsored by UHF
and built by CSI; (ii) petitioners knew that the initial estimate
would not be followed in the present project; (iii) CSI was a wholly
owned subsidiary of UHF; (iv) CSI's net worth was so small that
it could not have been legally held to complete the contract within
the original estimated costs; (v) the State Housing Commissioner
had waived his own rule regarding liquidity requirements in approving CSI as the contractor; and (vi) there was an additional undisclosed $200,000 agreement between CSI and Riverbay.

(!
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bases, respondents asserted two claims under the fraud
provisions of the Federal Securities Acts of 19·33 and
1934, 15 U. S. C. § 77g (a); 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b), and
17 CFR § 240.10b-5. They also presented a claim
against the State Financing Agency under the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and 10 pendent state law claims.
Petitioners, while denying the substance of these allegations,8 moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that federal jurisdiction was lacking. They maintained
that shares of stock in Riverbay were not "securities"
within the definitional sections of the Federal Securities
Acts. In addition, the state parties moved to dismiss on
sovereign immunity grounds.
The District Court granted the motion to dismiss.
366 F. Supp. 1117 (1973). It held that the denomination of the shares in Riverbay as "stock" did not, by
itself, make them securities under the federal acts. The
court further ruled, relying primarily on this Court's
decisions in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S.
344 (1943), and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293
( 1946), that the purchase in issue was not a security
since it was neither induced by an offer of tangible material profits, nor could such profits realistically be expected. In the District Court's words, it was "the
fundamental nonprofit nature of this transaction" which
presented "the insurmountable barrier to [respondents']
claims in the federal court." I d., at 1128. 0
Petitioners asserted that the Information Bulletin warned purchasers of the possibility of rental increases, and denied it omitted
material facts. They also argued that prior to occupancy all tenants
were informed that rental charges had increased. In any event,
petitioners claimed that respondents have suffered no damages since
they may move out and retrieve their initial investments in full.
9 The District Court also dismissed the § 1983 claim finding that
the securities laws claims were "the only well-plea.ded underlying
'basis for jurisdiction" under the Civil Rights Act. !d., at 1132. Iri
8
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.
500 F. 2d 1246 ( 1974). It rested its decision on two
alternative grounds. First, the court held that since the
shares purchased were called "stock" the Securities Acts,
which explicitly include "stock" in their definitional sections, literally applied. Second, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the transaction was an investment contract, within the meaning of the Acts and as defined by
Howey, since there was an expectation of profits from
three sources: (i) rental reductions resulting from the
income produced by the commercial facilities established
for the use of tenants at Co-Op City; (ii) tax deductions
for the portion of the monthly rental charges allocable
to interest payments on the mortgage; and (iii) savings
based on the fact that apartments at Co-Op City cost
substantially less than comparable nonsubsidized housing. The court further ruled that the immunity claims
by the state parties were unavailing. 10 Accordingly, the
case was remanded to the District Court for consideration
of respondents' claim on the merits.
In view of the importance of the issues presented we
granted certiorari. U. S. (1975). As we conclude that the disputed transactions are not securities
within the contemplation of the federal statutes, we
reverse.
view of these rulings the court did not reach the sovereign immunity
claims.
10 The Circuit Court held that the State Agency was independent
and distinct from the State itself and therefore it was a "person"
for purposes of § 1983, that both the Agency and the State had
waived immunity under § 32 (5) of the Private Housing Finance
Act, and that the State had also implicitly waived its immunity by
voluntarily participating in the sale of securities, an area subject to
plenary federal regulations. See Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Alabama
Docks Dept., 377 U. S. 184 (1964). In view of our disposition of
this case we do not reach these immunity issues.
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The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77b (1), de.
fines a "security" as
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond , debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a "security," or any certificate
of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for , receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant
or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing." 11
In providing this definition Congress did not attempt to
articulate the relevant economic criteria for distinguishing "securities" from "non-securities." Rather it sought
to define "the term 'security' in sufficiently broad and
general terms so as to include within that definition the
many types of instruments that in our commercial world
fall within the ordinary concept of a security." H. R.
Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1933). The task
has fallen to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) , the body charged with administering the Securities Acts, and ultimately to the federal courts to decide
which of the myriad of financial transactions in our society come within the coverage of these statutes.
In making this determination in the present case we
do not write on a clean slate. Well-settled principles
n The definition of a security in the 1934 Act is virtually identical
and, for present purposes, the coverage of the two Acts may be
C(/nsidered equivalent. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332,
336, 342 (1967); S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (1934).
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enunciated by this Court establish that the sale of shares
which entitle the purchaser to an apartment in Co-Op
City is not one of the "countless and variable schemes
devised by those who seek the use of the money of others
on the promise of profits," Howey, supra, 328 U. S., at
!299, and therefore it does not fall within "the ordinary
concept of a security."
A
We reject at the outset any suggestion that the present
<transaction, evidenced by the sale of shares called "stock,"
must be considered a security simply because the statutory definition of a security includes the words "any ...
stock." Rather we adhere to the basic principle that
has guided all of the Court's decisions in this area:
"In searching for the meaning and scope of the word
'security' in the Act[s], form should be disregarded
for substance and the emphasis should be on economic reality." Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S.,
332, 336 ( 1967).
See also Howey, supra, 328 U.S., at 298.
The primary purpose of the Securities Acts of 1933
and 1934 was to eliminate serious abuses in a largely
unregulated securities market by providing for the regulation of the sale of securities and the operation of
securities exchanges. The focus of the Acts are on the
capital market of the enterprise system: the raising of
capital for profit-making purposes by the sale of securities, the providing of trading exchanges therefor, and the
regulation thereof to prevent fraud and to protect the
interest of investors. Transactions within the securities
market, broadly defined, are economic in character; they
necessarily turn on economic reality rather than form. 12
~ 2 While the record does not indicate precisely why the term stock
was used for the instant transaction, it appears that this form is
generally used as a matter of tradition and convenience. See

?
,
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Thus, in construing these Acts against the background
of their purpose, we bear in mind a traditional canon of
statutory construction
"that a thing may be within the letter of the statute
and yet not within the statute, because not within
its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers."
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143
U. S. 457, 459 (1892). See also United States v.
American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 543
( 1940) .13
Respondents' reliance on Joiner as support for a "literal approach" to defining a security is misplaced. The
issue in J oinet was whether assignments of interests in
oil leases, coupled with the promoters' offer to drill an exploratory well, were securities. Looking to the econohlic
inducement provided by the proposed exploratory well,
the Court concluded that these leases were securities
even though "leases" as such were not included in the
list of instruments mentioned in the statutory definitions. In dictum the Court noted that "[i]nstruments
may be included within [the definition of a security], as
[a] a matter of law, if on their face they answer to the
name or description." 320 U. S., at 351 (emphasis supplied). And later, again in dictum, the Court stated
P. Rohan & M. Reskin, Cooperative Housing Law & Practice,
§ 2.01 (4) ( 1973).
13 With the exception of the Second Circuit, every court of appeals to consider the issue recently has rejected the literal approach
urged by respondents. See C. N. S. Enterprises-, Inc. v. G&G Enterprises, Inc., 508 F. 2d 1354 (CA7 1975); McClure v. First National
City Bank of Lubbock, 497 F. 2d 490 (CA5 1974), cert. denied, U. S. (1975); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F. 2d 689 (CA3
1973). See also 1 Loss, Securities Regulation 493 (2d ed. 1961)
("substance governs rather than form: . . . just as some things
which look like real estate are securities, some things which look like
securities are real estate.").
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that a security "might" be shown "by proving the document itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond or
a share of stock." I d., at 355 (emphasis supplied). By
using the conditional words "may" and "might" in these
dicta the Court made clear that it was not establishing
an inflexible rule barring inquiry into the economic realities underlying a transaction. On the contrary, the
Court intended only to make the rather obvious point
that, in contrast to the instrument before it which was
not included within the explicit statutory terms, most
instruments bearing these traditional titles are likely to
be covered by the statutes. 14
In holding that the name given to an instrument is not
dispositive, we do not suggest that the name is wholly
irrelevant to the decision whether it is a security. There
may be occasions when the use of a traditional name
such as "stocks" or "bonds" will lead a purchaser justifiably to assume that the federal securities laws apply.
This would clearly be the case when the underlying
transaction embodies some of the significant characteristics typically associated with the named instrument.
In the present case respondents do not contend, nor
could they, that they were misled by use of the word
· "stock" into believing that the federal securities laws governed their purchase. Common sense suggests that people who intend to acquire only a residential apartment in
· a state-subsidized cooperative, for their personal use, are
14 Nor can respondents derive any support for a literal approach
from Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra, which cited the Joiner dictum.
Indeed in Tcherepnin the Court explicitly stated that "form should
be disregarded for substance," id., at 336, and, only after analyzing
the economic realities of the transaction at issue did it conclude that
an instrument called a "withdrawable capital share" was, in substance, an "investment contract," a share of "stock," a "certificate
of interest or participation in a profit sharing agreement," and a
"transferable share."
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not likely to believe that in reality they are purchasing
investment securities simply because the transaction is
evidenced by something called a share of stock. Even
had there been reliance in this case on the nomenclature
used, it would have been misplaced because the stock
at issue had none of the characteristics "that in our
commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a
security." H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 11
(1933).
It should have been obvious to respondents
that the interest which they purchased, although denominated "stock," lacked what the Court in Tcherepnin deemed the most essential feature of stock: the right
to receipt of "dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits." 289 U. S., at 339. Since Riverbay
was a nonprofit corporation, there could be no profits and
hence no distribution of profits by way of dividends.
These shares also lack the other characteristics traditionally associated with stock: they are not negotiable; they
cannot be pledged or hypothecated; they confer no voting rights in proportion to the number of shares owned;
and they cannot appreciate in value. In short, the
inducement to purchase was solely to acquire subsidized
low-cost living space; it was not to invest for profit.
We conclude that the designation of the instruments
transferred as "stock" cannot control their legal effect or
bring the transaction within the federal securities laws.
Viewing economic reality rather than mere form, we hold
that the shares purchased by respondents were not stock
within the meaning of these laws.

B
The Court of Appeals, as an alternative ground for its
decision , concluded that a share in Riverbay was also an
"investment contract" as defined by the Securities Acts.
Respondents also argue, in the alternative, that in any

74-157 & 74-647-0PINION
UNITED HOUSING FOUNDATION, INC. v. FORMAN 13

event what they agreed to purchase is "commonly known
as a 'security' " within the meaning of these laws. In
making this determination we again must examine the
substance-the economic realities of the transactionrather than the names that may have been employed
by the parties. We perceive no distinction, for present
purposes, between an investment contract or a security.
In either case, the basic test for distinguishing the instrument from other commercial dealings is
"whether the scheme involves an investment of
money in a common enterprise with profits to come
solely from the efforts of others." 328 U. S., at 301.
This test, in shorthand form , embodies the essential attributes that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security. The touchstone is the presence of an
investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entreprenurial or managerial efforts of others. By profits, the
Court has meant either capital appreciation resulting
from the development of the initial investment, see
Joiner, supra (sale of oil leases conditioned on promoters'
agreement to drill exploratory well); Howey, supra (sale
of orange groves coupled with service contract to cultivate, harvest and sell the crops), or a participation in
earnings, typically called "dividends," resulting from the
use of investors' funds, see SEC v. Variable Annuity Life
Insurance Co., 359 U. S. 65 (1959) (annuity payments
fluctuate with value of insurance company's investment
portfolio); Tcherep1tin v. Knight, supra (dividends on
the investment based on savings and loan association's
profits). The investor is "attracted solely by the prospects of a return" on his investment. Howey, supra,
328 U. S., at 300. By contrast, when a purchaser is
motivated by a desire to use or consume the item pur-
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chased-"to occupy the land or to develop it themselves,"
as the Howey Court put it, 328 U.S., at 300-the securities laws do not .apply. See Joiner, supra. 15
In the present case there can be no doubt that investors
were attracted solely by the prospect of acquiring a place
to live, and not by financial returns on their investments?6 The Information Bulletin used to interest prospective residents emphasized the fundamental nature and
purpose of the undertaking:
"A cooperative is a nonprofit enterprise controlled
democratically by its members-the people who are
using its services . . . .
"People find living in a cooperative community
-enjoyable for more than one reason. Most people
join, however, for the simple reason that it is a way
to obtain decent housing at a reasonable price.
However, there are other advantages. The purpose
of a cooperative is to provide home ownership, not
just apartments to rent. The community is deIn Joiner, the Court stated:
"Undisputed facts seem to us, however, to establish the conclusion
that defendants were not, as a practical matter, offering naked
leasehold rights. Had the offer mailed by defendants omitted the
economic inducements of the proposed and promised exploration
well, it would have been quite a different proposition." 320 U. S.,
at 348.
This distinction was critical because the exploratory drillings gave
the investments "most of their value and all of their lure." Id.,
at 349. The land itself was purely an incidental consideration in
the transaction.
16 In some transactions the investor is offered both a commodity
for use and an expectation of profits. See SEC Release No. 33-5347
in 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (Jan. 18, 1973). See generally Rohan, The
Securities Law Implications of Condominium Marketing Programs
Which Feature a Rental Agency or Rental Pool, 2 Conn. L. Rev. 1
(1969). The application of the federal securities laws to these trans~
actions may raise difficult questions that are not present in this case.
15
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signed to provide a favorable environment for family
and community living....
"The common bond of collective ownership which
you share makes living in a cooperative different.
It is a community of neighbors. Home ownership,
common interests and the community atmosphere
make living in a cooperative like living in a small
town. As a rule there is very little turnover in a
cooperative." Appendix, at 162a-164a.
Nowhere does the Bulletin seek to attract investors by
the hope of profits resulting from the efforts of the promoters or third parties. On the contrary, the Bulletin
repeatedly emphasizes the "nonprofit" nature of the en,deavor. It explains that if rental charges exceed expenses the difference will be returned as a rebate, not
invested for profit. It also informs purchasers that they
will be unable to resell their apartments at a profit since
the apartment must first be offered back to Riverbay "at
the price paid for it." 17 In short, neither of the kinds
of profits traditionally associated with securities were
offered to respondents.
The Court of Appeals recognized that there must be
an expectation of profits, and conceded that there is "no
possible profit on a resale of [this] stock." 500 F. 2d,
17
This requirrment effectively insures that no apartment will be
sold for more than its original cost. Consonant with the purposes
of the Mitchell-Lama Act, whenever there are prospective purchasers willing to pay as much as the initial purchase price for an
apartment in Co-Op City, Riverbay will purchase back the apartment and resell it at its original cost. See Appendix, at 138a.
Indeed if, for some reason, Riverbay does not repurchase these
apartments, a tenant is prohibited by law from reselling his apartment for more than the purchase price plus a fraction of the mortgage amortization that he has paid, and then only to an approved
tenant. See N. Y. Private Housing Finance Law § 31-a. (McKinney Supp. 1974-1975).
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at 1254. The court correctly noted, however, that profit
may be derived from the income yielded by an investment as well as from captia,] appreciation, and then proceeded to find "an expectation of 'income' in at least
three ways." Ibid. Two of these supposed sources of
income or profits may be disposed of summarily. We
turn first to reliance by the Court of Appeals on the
deductibility for tax purposes of the portion of the
monthly rental or "occupancy charge" that is applied to
interest on the mortgage. We know of no basis in law
( or economics for the view that payment of interest, with
v 2 the consequent deductibility for tax purposes, constitutes ·
mcome or _profits. The tax ' benefit here relied upon is
available to any homeowner who pays interest on his
mortgage. See Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S. C. § 216;
·Eckstein v. United States, 452 F. 2d 1036 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
'T his is a function of the tax laws that is wholly unrelated
to any concept of profits from an investment.u
The Court of Appeals also found support for its notion
·of profits in the fact that Co-Op City offered space at
a cost substantially below the going rental charges for
comparable housing. Again, this is a wholly novel
theory of "profits" and one we cannot accept. The low
rent derives from the substantial financial subsidies pro. vided by the State of New York. This benefit cannot be
liquidated into cash; nor does it result from the managerial efforts of others. In a real sense, it no more
embodies the attributes of income or profits than do welfare benefits, food stamps or other government subsidies.
The final source of profit relied on by the Court of
Appeals was the possibility of net income derived from
18

See Rosenbaum, The Resort Condominium and the Federal
Securities Law-a Case Study in Government Inflexibility, 60 Va. L.
n.ev. 785, 795-796 (1974); Casenote, 62 Geo. L. Rev. 1515, 15241526.

L
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the leasing of Co-Op City of commercial facilities, pro~
fessional offices and parking spaces, and its operation
c0f community washing machines. The income, if any,
from these conveniences, all located within the common
areas of the housing project, was to be used to reduce
tenant rental cost. Conceptually, one might readily
.agree that net income from the leasing of commercial
and professional facilities is the kind of profit traditionally associated with a security investment. 1 9 See
Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra. But in the present case
this income-if indeed there is any-is far too speculative and insubstantial to bring the entire transaction
within the Securities Acts.
Initially we note that the prospect of such income as
a means of offsetting rental costs is never mentioned in
the Information Bulletin. T_hus it is clear that investors ',
were not attracted to Co-Op Ci~ by the offer..2f_p_9t~n1a rental reductions resulting from the leasing of these
tacllitles. Moreover, there is nothing in the record to
s uggest tbat these facilities do in fact return a profit in
the sense that the leasing fees are greater than the actual
cost to Co-Op City of the space rented. 20 The short of
the matter is that the stores and services in question
were established not as a means of returning profits to
The "income" derived from the rental of parking spa ces and the
operation of washing machines clearly was not profits for respondents since these facilities were provided exclusively for the use of
tenants. Thus when the income collected from the use of these
facilities exceeds the cost of their operation the t enants simply
receive the return of an initial overcharge in the form of a rent
rebate.
20 The Court of Appeals quoted the gross rental income received
from these facilities. But such figures by themselves are irrelevant
since the record does not indicate the cost to Co-Op City of providing and maintaining the rented space. There can be no profits
in the absence of net income.
1. 9

I'I•

. I
I

~

,J

~f

74-157 & 74-647-0PINION'
18 UNITED HOUSING FOUNDATION, INC. v. FORMAN

tenants, but for the purpose of making available essential services for the residents of this enormous complex. 21
Without stores in which to shop, and medical and dental
offices in which to receive treatment, this development
seeking to house 50,000 people would hardly be a viable
community. See generally Miller, Cooperative Apartments: Real Estate or Securities? 45 B. U. L. Rev. 464,
500 (1965). In sum, these commercial facilities are
simply incidental to the project. Undoubtedly they
make Co-Op City a more attractive housing opportunity, but the possibility of some rental reduction is not an
"expectation of profit" in the sense found necessary
in Howey. 22
21 By statute these commercial facilities could only be "incidental
and appurtenant" to the housing project. N. Y. Private Housing
Law§ 12 (5) (McKinney Supp. 1974-1975).
22 Respondents urge us to abandon the element of profits in the
tlefinition of securities and to adopt the "risk capital" approach
articulated by the California Supreme Court in Silver Hills Country
Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P. 2d 906 (1961). Cf. El
Kahadem v. Equity Securities Corp., 494 F. 2d 1224 (CA9 1974),
cert. denied, U. S. (1974). See generally Coffey, The Economic Realities of a Security: Is There a More Meaningful Formula?", 18 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 367 (1967); Long, "An Attempt to
Return 'Investment Contracts' to the Mainstream of Securities
ltegulations,'l 24 Okla. L. Rev. 135 (1971); Hannan & Thomas,
The Importance o£ Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal
Securities, 25 Hast. L. Rev. 219 (1974). Even if we were inclined
to adopt such a "risk capital" approach we would not apply it in
the present case. Purchasers of apartments in Co-Op City take no
risk in any significant sense. If dissatisfied with their apartments,
they may recover their initial investment in full. See n. 6, supra.
Respon~s assert that if Co-Op City becomes bankrupt they
stand to lose their whole investment. But, in view of the fact
t.hat the State has financed over 92% of the cost of construction
and carefully rl:lgulates the development and operation of the project,
bankruptcy in the normal sense is an unrealistic possibility. In
any event, the risk of insolvency of an ongoing housing cooperative
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There is no doubt that purchasers in this housing
cooperative sought to obtain a decent home at an attractive price. But that type of economic interest characizes every form of commercial transaction. What
distinguishes a security transaction-and what is absent
here-is an investment where one parts with his money
in the hope of receiving profits from the efforts of others,
·and not where he purchases a commodity for personal
consumption or living quarters for personal use. 23
,.
"differ[s] vastly" from the kind of risk of "fluctuating" value
:associated with securities investments. SEC. v. Variable Annuity
Life Insurance Co., supra, 395 U. S., at 90-91 (BHENNAN, J., concurring). See Hannan & Thomas, supra, at 242-249; Long, Introduction to Symposium: Interpreting The Statutory Definition of a
Security: Some Pragmatic Considerations, 6 St. Mary's L. J. 96,
126-128 (1974).
23 The SEC has filed an amicus brief urging us to hold the federal
securities laws applicable to this case. Traditionally the views of
an agency charged with administering the governing statute would
be entitled to considerable weight. See, e. g., United States National Association of Securities Dealers, - U . S . - (1975)(slp op.,
at 22); Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U. S. 65 (1974); Investment Company
.Institute v. Camp,401 U.S. 617, 626-627 (1971). But in this case the
SEC's position flatly contradicts what would appear to be a rather
careful statement of the Commission's views in a recent release.
In Release No. 33-5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (Jan. 18, 1973), applicable to "the sale of condominium units and other units in a real
tlstate development," the SEC stated its view that only those real
estate investments that are "offered and sold with emphasis on the
economic benefits to the purchaser to be derived from the managerial efforts of the promoter, or a third party designated or
arranged for by the promoter," are to be considered securities. Id.,
at 1736. In particular, the Commission explained that the Securities Acts do not apply when "commercial facilities are a part of a
residential project" if
"(a) the income from such facilities is used only to offset common area
expenses and (b) the operation of such facilities is incidental to the
project as a whole and are not established as a primary income

'
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III
In holding that there is no federal jurisdiction, we
do not address the merits of respondents' claim. Nor do
we indicate any view as to whether the type of claims
here involved should be protected by federal rather than
state law. 24 We decide only that the type of transaction
source for the individual owners of a condominium or cooperative
unit."
See also SEC Real Estate Advisory Committee Report 74-91
(1972); Dickey & Thorpe, Federal Security Regulation of Condominimum Offerings, 19 N.Y. L. F. 473 (1974).
Several commentators have noted the inconsistency between the
SEC's position in the above release and the decision by the Court of
Appeals in this case, which the SEC now supports. See Berman
& Stone, Federal Securities Law and the Sale of Condominiums,
Homes and Homesite, 30 Bus. Law. 411, 420-425 (1975); Note,
Condominium Regulation: Beyond Disclosure, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev.
'639, 654-655 (1975). In view of this unexplained contradiction in
the Commission's position we accord no special weight to its views.
See Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 404 U. S. 418,
426 (1972); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, U. S . (1975) (slip op., at 21 n. 8).
24
Several commentators have suggested that the sale of housing
·developments such as condominiums and cooperatives is in need of
federal regulation and therefore that the securities laws should be
·stretched to reach these transactions. See, e. g., Note, Federal Securties Regulation of Condominiums: A Purchaser's Perspective, 62
Geo. L. J. 1403 (1974); Note, Cooperative Housing Corporations
and the Federal Securities Laws, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 118 (1971).
Others have disagreed, claiming that the extensive body of regulation developed over more than four decades under these acts would
be in appropriate and also costly to the sellers and buyers of residential housing. See Berman & Stone, supra, n. 23; Note, Condominimum Regulation: Beyond Disclosure, supra, n. 23. Moreover,
extension of the coverage of the securities laws to real estate transactions would involve important questions as to the appropriate
balance between state and federal responsibility. In any event, the
determination of whether and in what manner federal regulation
may be required for housing transactions, where the characterIstics of an investment in securities are not present, is better left
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before us, in which the purchasers were interested in
acquiring housing rather than making an investment for
profit, is not within the scope of the federal securities
laws.
Since respondents' claims are not cognizable in federal
court, their complaint must be dismissed. 25 The judgment below is ther~OI:e

Reversed.

to tho Congress which can assess both the costs and benefits of any
such regulation. Indeed, only recently, Congress instructed the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development "to conduct a full
and complete investigation and study ... with respect to ... the
problems, difficulties and abuses or potential abuses applicable to
condominium and cooperative housing." Pub. L. 93-383, 88 Stat.
740 (Aug. 22, 1974). See also Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-533; Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S. C. §§ 1701-1720.
25 Besides the Securities Acts claims, respondents also included
a vague and conclusory allegation under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against
petitioner, the New York State Housing Finance Agency. We
agree with the District Court that "the federal securities allegations
represent the only well pleaded underlying basis for jurisdiction
under [§ 1983]." 366 F. Supp., at 1132. Thus that count must
also be dismissed. The remaining counts in the complaint were all
predicated on alleged violations of state law, not independently cognizable in federal court.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The issue in this case is whether shares of stock entitling a purchaser to lease an apartment in Co-Op City,
a state subsidized and supervised nonprofit housing cooperative, are "securities" within the purview of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.
I
Co-Op City is a massive housing cooperative in New
York City. Built between 1965 and 1971 , it presently
houses approximately 50,000 people on a 200-acre site
containing 35 high rise buildings and 236 town houses.
The project was organized, financed , and constructed
under the New York State Private Housing Finan ce Law,
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commonly known as the Mitchell-Lama Act, enacted to
ameliorate a perceived crisis in the availability of decent
low-income urban housmg. In order to encourage pri vate developers to build low cost cooperative housing,
New York prcvides thfm with large long-term, lowinterest mortgage loans and substantial tax exemptious.
Receipt./'"Of such benefits is conditioned on a willingness to have the State review virtually every step in
the development of the coopera.tive. See N. Y. Private
Housing Finance Law ~§ 11-40 (McKinney Supp. 19741975). The developer also must agree to operate the
facility "on a nonprofit basis," id., at ~ 11-a (2a), and he
may lease apartments only to people whose incomes fall
below a certain level and who have been approved by the
State.1
The United Housing Foundation (UHF), a nonprofit
membership corporation established for the purpose of
"aiding and encouraging" the creation of "adequate, safe
and sanitary housing accommodations for ws,ge earners
and other persons of low and moderate income," 2 Appendix, at 95a, was responsible for initiating and sponsoring
the development of Co-Op City. Acting under the
Mitchell-Lama Act, UHF organized the Riverbay Corporation (Riverbay) to own and operate the land and
buildings constituting Co-Op City. Riverbay, a nonprofit cooperative housing corporation, issued the stock
that is the subject of this litigation. UHF also con1 Eligibilit:v is limited to familie:; whose monthly income does not
exceed s1x time:,; thP monthly rental charge (or for famil!e::; of fonr
or more, seven times the rental charge) . N . Y Private Hou~ing
Finance Law § 31 (2) (a) (McKmney Supp. 1974-1975) Preference
in admissiOn must be g1ven to vrteran::; , the hand1cappef!, and t hi'
elderly ld., at § 31 (7)-(9)
2 UHF is composed ot labor unions, housing cooperative~, and
civic group~ . H has <~pon::;orrrt thr ronHt ructiOn of ~e vera 1 ma,10r
housing cooperatJVe~-< in New York Cny.
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tracted with Community Serv1ces, Inc. ( CSI), its wholly
owned subsidiary, to serve as the general contractor and
sales agent for the project.~ As required by the MitchellLama Act, these decisions were approved by the State
Housing Commissioner.
To acquire an apartment in Co-Op City an eligible
prospective purchaser must buy 18 shares of stock in
Riverbay for each room desired. The cost per share
is $25, making the total cost $450 per room, or $1,800
for a four-room apartment. The sole purpose of acquiring these shares is to enable the purchaser to
occupy an apartment in Co-Op City; in effect, their
purchase is a recoverable deposit on an apartment. The
shares are explicitly tied to the apartment: they cannot
be transferred to a nontenant; nor can they be pledged
or encumbered; and they descend, along with the apartment, only to a surviving, spouse. No voting rights attach to the shares as such: participation in the affairs of
the cooperative appertains to the apartment, with the
residents of each apartment being entitled to one vote
irrespective of the number of shares owned.
Any tenant who wants to terminate his occupancy, or
who is forced to move out.j must offer his stock to RiverhEW at its initial selling price of $25 per share. In the extremely unlikely event that Riverbay declines to repurchase the stock/ the tenan~; cannot sell it for more than
CSI is a business corporation that has acted a~ the contractor
on several UHF-~ponsored honsmg cooprratives.
4
A tenant can be forced to move out if he violates the provi:;ions
of h1:; "occupancy ngreemrnt," wh1ch 1s essentially a lease for the
aJJartment, or if h1s mconw grows to exrred the eligibihty standards.
~To datr evrry family that ha:; Withdrawn from Co-Op City hao
received back Its mmal payment m full. Indeed, at the time this
8Uit was filed thrre wen• 7,000 families on the waiting list for apartmentl:l in this cooperative. In addition, a ~:>perwl fund of m•arly
3
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the initial purchase price plus a fractiOn of the portion
of the mortgage that he has paid off, and then only to a
prospective tenant satisfying the statutory income eligibility requirements. See N. Y. Private Housing Finance
Law § 31-a (McKinney Supp. 1974-1975).
In May 1965, subsequent to the completion of the
initial planning, Riverbay circulated an Information
Bulletin seeking to attract tenants for what would someday be apartments in Co-Op Cit.y. After describing the
nature and advantages of cooperative housing generally
and of Co-Op City in particular, the Bulletin informed
prospective tenants that the total estimated cost of the
project, based largely on an anticipated construction contract with CSI, was $283,695,550. Only a fraction of this
sum, $32,795,550, was to come from the purchase of
shares by tenants. The remaining $250,900,000 was to
be financed by a 40-year low-interest mortgage loan from
the New York Private Housing Finance Agency. After
construction of the project the mortg2.ge payments and
current operating expenses would be met by monthly
rental charges paid by the tenants. While these rental
charges were to vary, depending on the size, nature, and location of an apartment, the 1965 Bulletin
estimated that the "average" monthly cost would be
$23.02 per room, or $92.08 for a four-room apartment.
Several times during the construction of Co-Op City,
Riverbay, with the approval of the State Housing Commissioner, revised its contract with CSI to allow for
increased construction costs. In addition, Riverbay
incurred other expenses that had not been reflected in the
1965 Bulletin. To meet these increased expenditures,
Riverbay, with the Commissioner's approval, repeatedly
$1 million had been e~tabhshed by :;mall monthy contributiom; from
all tenant;; to insure that those wnnhng to movr out would receive
full compensation for theJr share!:'.
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secured increased mortgage loans from the State Housing
Agency. Ultimately the construction loan was $125
million more than the figure estimated in the 1965 Bulletin. As a result, while the initial purchasing price
remained at $450 per room, the average monthly rental
charges increased periodically, reaching a figure of $39.68
per room as of July 1974.0
These increases in the rental charges precipitated the
present lawsuit. Respondents, 57 residents of Co-Op
City, sued in federal court on behalf of all 15,372 apart·ment owners, and derivatively on behalf of Riverbay,
seeking upwards of $30 million in damages, forced rental
reductions and other "appropriate" relief. Named as
defendants (petitioners herein) were UHF, CSI, Riverbay, several individual directors of these organizations, the State of New York, and the State Private
Housing Finance Agency. The heart of respondents'
claim was that the 1965 Co-Op City Information Bulletin
falsely represented that CSI would bear all subsequent
cost increases due to factors such as inflation. Respond..
ents further alleged that they were misled in their
purchases of shares since the Information Bulletin
failed to disclose several critical facts.7 On these bases,
6 As the rental charges increased, the income eligibility requirements for resident8 of Co-Op City expanded accordingly. See n. I,

sup.ra.

Respondents maintained that the following material facts w~re
omitted: (i) the original est1mated cost had never been adhered to
in any of the previous Mitchell-Lama projects sponsored by UHF
and built by CSI; (ii) petitioners knew that the initial estimate
would not be followed in the present project ; (iii) CSI was a wholly
owned ~ubsidiary of UHF; (iv) CSI's net worth was so small tha.t
it could not have been legally held to complete the contract within
the original estimated costs ; (v) the State Housing Commissioner
had waived his own rule regarding liquidity requirements in approving CSI as the contractm; and (vi) there was an additional undis~
elosed contract between CST and Rivf:'rbay
7
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respondents asserted two claims under the fraud pro~
visions of the federal Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934,
15 U. S. C. § 77q (a); 15 U. S. C. § 78j (h), and
17 CFR § 240.10b-5. They also presented a claim
against the State Financing Agency under the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and 10 pendent state law claims.
Petitioners, while denyin6 the substance of these allegations,8 moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that federal jurisdiction was lacking. They maintained
that shares of stock in Riverbay were not "securities"
within the definitional sections of the federal Securities
Acts. In addition, the state parties moved to dismiss on
sovereign immunity grounds.
The District Court granted the motion to dismiss.
366 F. Supp. 1117 (1973). It held that the denomination of the shares in Riverbay as "stock" did not, by
itself, make them securities under the federal acts. The
court further ruled, relying primarily on this Court's
decisions in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S.
344 (1943), and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293
(1946), that the purchase in issue was not a security
transaction since it was neither induced by an offer of
tangible material profits, nor could such profits realistic~:~lly be expected. In the District Court's words, it was
"the fundamental nonprofit nature of this transaction"
which presented "the msurmountable barrier to lrespondents'] claims in the federal court.'' ld., at 1128.9
8

Petitioners asserted that the Information Bulletin warned purchasers of the posi:nbihty of rental mcreases, and demed that it
omitted material facts. They also argued that pnor to occupancy all
tenants were mformed that rental charges had increased. In any
event, p('tit10ners clauned that rPspondents have suffered no damages
since they may move out and retneve thtlr uutial mvestments in full.
11 The Distnct Court also dism1ssed the § J9&'3 claim finding that
the securities laws cla1ms were ''the only well-pleaded underlying
bas1s for junsdict10n under the Civil Rights Act " !d., at 1132. In
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.
500 F. 2d 1246 (1974). It rested its decision on two
alternative grounds. First, the court held that since the
shares purchased were called "stock" the Securities Acts,
which explicitly include "stock" in their definitional sections, were literally applicable. Second, the Court of Appeals concluded that the transaction was an investment
contract within the meaning of the Acts and as defined by
Howey, since there was an expectation of profits from
three sources: ( i) rental reductions resulting from the
income produced by the commercial facilities established
for the use of tenants at Co-Op City; (ii) tax deductions
for the portion of the monthly rental charges allocable
to interest payments on the mortgage; and (i1i) savings
based on the fact that apartments at Co-Op City cost
substantially less than comparable nonsubsidized housing. The court further ruled that the immunity claims
by the State parties were unavailing. 111 Accordingly, the
case was remanded to the District Court for consideration
of respondents' claim on the merits.
In view of the importance of the issues presented we
granted certiorari. 419 U. S. 1120 ()975). As we conclude that the disputed transactions are not purchases of
securities within the contemplation of the federal statutes, we reverse.
view of these rulings the court did not reach the sovereign immunity
claims.
10 The Circuit Court held that the State Agency was independent
and distinct from the Stat~ iis~lf and therefore was a "person"
for purposes of § 1983, that both the Agency and the State had
waived immumty under § 32 (5) of the Private Housing Finance
Act, and that the State had also implicitly wa1ved its immunity by
voluntarily participating in the sale of securities, an area subject to
plenary federal regulation. See Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Alabama
Docks Dept., 377 U. S. 184 (1964) . In view of our disposition of
this case we do not reach these issues.
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H
The Securities Act of 1933, 15 Uo S.C. § 77b (1),
fines a "security" a.s

de~

uany note, ~tock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, col~
lateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate of deposit for a security, frac~
tiona] undivided interest in oil, gas. or other mineral
rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a "security," or any certificate
of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant
or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing." 11
In providing this definition Congress did not attempt to
articulate the relevant economic criteria for distinguishing "securities" from "non-securities." Rather it sought
to define "the term 'security' in sufficiently broad and
general terms so as to iucl ude within that definition the
many types of instruments that in our commercial world
fal: within the ordinary concept of a security." H. R.
Rep. No. 85, 73d Coug., 1st :Sess., 11 (1933). The task
has fallen to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), the body charged with administering the Securities Acts, and ultimately to the federal courts to decide
which of the myriad financial transactions in our so~
ciety come wit.hin the eoverage of these statutes.
:n The definition of a Hecurity in the 1934 Act i& virtually identical
and, for present purpose:;, the coverage of the two Acts may be
considered the Bame. See Tcherepnin v Kmght, 389 U S. 332,
336, :342 (1967) ; S. Rep. No. 792, 7:3d Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (1934).
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In making this determination in the present case we
do not write on a clean slate. Well-settled principles
enunciated by this Court establish that the sale of shares
which entitle the purchaser to an apartment in Co-Op
City is not one of the "countless and variable schemes
devised by those who seek the use of the money of others
on the promise of profit~S," Howey, supra, 328 U. S., at
299, and therefore these shares do not fall within "the
ordinary concept of a security."
A
We reject at the outset any suggestion that the present
transaction, evidenced by the sale of shares called
"stock," 12 must be considered a security transaction simply because the statutory definition of a security includes
the words "and . .. stock." Rather we adhere to the
basic principle that has guided all of the Court's decisions in this area:
"In searching for the meaning and E;Cope of the word
'security' in the Act[s], form should be disregarded
for substance and the emphasis should be on economic reality." Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S.,
332, 336 (1967) . See also Howey, supra, 328 U. S.,
at 298.

The primary parpose of the Securities Acts of 1933
and 1934 was to eliminate serious abuses in a largely
unregulated securities market by providing for the regu~
lation of the sale of securities and the operation of
securities exchanges. Plainly the need for this regula+,wn depends on the economic realities underlying certain
iuvestment transactions, and not on the names given to
these transactions. Thus, m construing these Acts
While the record does not indicate prt'cisely why the term stock
was used for the instant transaction, it appear~ that this form is
generally Ubed as a, matter of tradition and convenience. See
12
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against the background of their purpose, we are guide<.l
by a traditional canon of statutory construction:
"that a thing may be within the letter of the statute
and yet not within the statute, because not within
its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers."
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143
U. S. 457, 459 (1892). See also United States v.
American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 543
(1940) .13
Respondents' reliance on Joiner as support for a "lit-eral approach" to defining a security is misplaced. The
issue in Joiner was whether assignments of interests in
o~l leases, coupled with the promoters' offer to drill an exploratory well, were securities. Looking to the economic
inducement provided by the proposed exploratory well,
the Court concluded that these leases were securities
even though "leases" as such were not included in the
list _.?yinstruments mentioned in the otatutory definitionl" In dictum the Court noted that "[i] nstruments
may be included within [the definition of a security], as
[a] matter of law, if on their face they answer to the
name or description." 320 U. S., at 351 (emphasis supplied). And later, again in dictum, the Court stated
P. Rohan & M. Reskin, Cooperative Housing Law & Practice,
§ 2.01 (4) (1973) .
13 With the exception of the Second Circuit, every court of appeals recently to consider the issue has rejected the literal approach
urged by respondents . See C. N. S. EnterrYriseSJ, Inc. v. G&G Enterprises, Inc., 508 F. 2d 1354 (CA7 1975); McClure v. First National
Bank of Lubbock, 497 F . 2d 490 (CA5 1974), cert. demed, 420
U. S. 930 (1975); Lino v. City hvesting Co., 487 F. 2d 689 (CA3
1973). See also 1 Loss, Securities Regulation 493 (2d ed. 1961)
("substance governs rather than form: . . . just as some things:
which look like real estate are securities, some things which look like·
Becurities are real estate.") .

. '
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that a security "mtght" be shown "by proving the docu"
ment itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond or
a share of stock.'' !d., at 355 (emphasis supplied). By
using the conditional words "may" and "might" in these
dicta the Court made clear that it was not establishing
an inflexible rule barring inquiry into the economic realities underlying a transaction. On the contrary, the
Court intended only to make the rather obvious point
that, in contrast to the instrument before it which was
not included within the explicit statutory terms, most
instruments bearing these traditional titles are likely to
be covered by the statutes. 14
In holding that the name given to an instrument is not
dispositive, we do not suggest that the name is wholly
irrelevant to the decision whether it is a security. There
may be occasions when the use of a traditional name
such as "stocks" or "bonds" will lead a purchaser justifiably to assume that the federal securities laws apply.
This would clearly be the case when the underlying
transaction embodies some of the significant characteristics typically associated with the named instrument.
In the present case respondents do not contend, nor
could they, that they were misled by use of the word
"stock" into believing that the federal securities laws governed their purchase. Common sense suggests that people who intend to acquire only a residential apartment in
a state-subsidized cooperative, for their personal use, are
14

Nor can re;pondents derive any support for a literal approach
from Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra, which cited the Joiner dictum,
Indeed in Tcherepnin the Court explicitly :stated that ''form should
be di~regarded for substance,' uf., at 336, and, only after analyzmg
the economic realitie;; of the tram-action at i:ssue did It conclude that
an in:strument called a "withdrawable capital :share" was, in substance, an "investment contract,'' a share of "stock," a "certificate
of interest or participatiOn in a profit sharmg agreement," and a
"transferable share."
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not likely to believe that ir1 reality they are purchasing
investment securities simpiy because the transaction is.:
evidenced by something called a share of stock. These
shares lack what the Court in Tcherepnin deemed the
most common feRtun~
stock: the right to receipt of
"dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits."
289 U.S., at 339. :Nor do they possess the other charac~
teristics traditionally associated with stock: they are not
negotiable; they cannot be pledged or hypothecated;
they confer no voting rights in proportion to the number
Of shares owned; and they cannot appreciate in value.
In short, the inducement to purchase was solely to acquire subsidized low-cost living space i it was not to
invest for profit.
·

of

B
· The Court of Appeals, as an alternative ground for its
decision, concluded that a share in Riverbay was also an
"investment contract" as defined by the Securities Acts.
Respondents further argue that in any event what they
agreed to purchase is "commonly known as a 'security'"
within the meaning of these laws. In making this determination we again must examine the substance-the
economic realities of the transaction-rather than the
names that may have been employed by the parties.
We perceive uo distinction , for present purposes, between an investment contract and an instrument commonly known as a security. In either case, the basic
test for distinguishing the instrument from other commercia] dealings is
"whether the scheme involves an investment of
money in a common enterprise with profits to come
solely from the efforts of others!' Howey, supra,.
328 U.S., at :30L
This test, in shorthand form, embodies the essential attri..
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butes that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security. The touchstone is the presence of an
investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entreprenurial or managerial efforts of others. By profits, the
Court has meant either capital appreciation rAsulting
from the development of the initial investment, see
Joiner, supra (sale of oil leases conditioned on promoters'
agreement to drill exploratory well), or a participation in
earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds, see
Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra (dividends on the investment based on savings and loan association's profits) .
In such ca'tles the investor is "attracted solely by the prospects of a return" on his investment. Howey, supra,
328 U. S., at 300. By contrast, when a purchaser is
motivated by a desire to use or consume the item purchased-"to occupy the land or to develop it themselves,"
as the Howey Court put it, 328 U.S., at 300-the securities laws do not apply.15 See Joiner, supra.16
In some transactions the invrstor is offered both a commodity or
real estate for use and an expectation of profits. See SEC Release
No. 33-5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (Jan . 18, 1973). See generally
Rohan, The Securities Law Implications of Condominium Marketing
Programs Which Feature a Rental Agency or Rental Pool, 2 Conn.
L. Rev. 1 ( 1969) . The applica t10n of the federal securities Ia ws to
these transactions may ra.Jse difficult questions that are not, present
in this case.
1 6 In Joiner, the Court stat('d :
'·Undisputed facts seem to us, however, to establish the conclusion
that defendants were not, as a practical matter, offering naked
leasehold rights. Had the offer mailed by defendants omitted the
economic inducements of the proposed and promised exploration
well, it would have been qlllte a different proposition." 320 U . S.,
at 348.
This distinction was critical becam;e the exploratory drillings gave
"the investments 1'll10f'lt of their value and all of their lure." Id.,
15

·.

'.

'

'
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In the present case there can be no doubt that investors
were attracted solely by the prospect of acquiring a place
to live, and not by financial returns on their investments. The Information Bulletin distributed to prospective residents emphasized the fundamental nature and
purpose of the undertaking :
"A cooperative is a nonprofit enterprise controlled
democratically by its members-the people who are
using its services. . . .
"People find living in a cooperative community
enjoyable for more than one reason. Most people
join, however, for the simple reason that it is a way
to obtain decent housing at a reasonable price.
However, there are other advantages. Tile purpose
of a cooperative is to provide home ownership, not
just apartments to rent. The community is designed to provide a favorable environment for family
and community living....
"The common bond of collective ownership which
you share makes living in a cooperative different.
It is a community of neighbors. Home ownership,
common interests and the community atmosphere
make living in a cooperative like living in a small
town. As a rule there is very little turnover in a
cooperative." Appendix, at 162a-164a.
Nowhere does the Bulletin seek to attract investors by
the prospect of profits resulting from the efforts of the
promoters or third parties. On the contrary, the Bulletin
repeatedly emphasizes the "nonprofit" nature of the endeavor. lt explains that if rental charges exceed expenses the difference will be returned as a rebate, not
invested for profit. It also informs purchasers that they
at 349. The land itself was purely an mcidental con<Jideration in
the transaction .
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will be unable to resell their apartments at a profit since
the apartment must first be offered back to Riverbay "at
the price paid for it." l7 In short, neither of the kinds
of profits traditionally associated with securities were
offered to respondents.
The Court of Appeals recognized that there must be
an expectation of profits for these shares to be securities,
and conceded that there is "no possible profit on a resale
of [this] stock." 500 F. 2d, at 1254. The court correctly noted, however, that profit may be derived from
the income yielded by an investment as well as from
capital appreciation, and then proceeded to find "an
expectation of 'income' in at least three ways." Ibid.
Two of these supposed sources of income or profits may
be disposed of summarily. We turn first to the Court
of Appeals' reliance on the deductibility for tax purposes
of the portion of the monthly rental charge applied to
interest on the mortgage. Even if these deductions
could be considered profits they are not the kind of
profits associated with a security transaction since they
do not derive from the managerial efforts of others.18
Rather these deductions are tax benefits available to any
This requirement effectively insures that no apartment will be
sold for more than its original cost. Consonant with the purposes·
of the Mitchell-Lama Act, whenever there are prospective purchasers willmg to pay as much as the initial purC'hase price for an
apartment in Co-Op City, Riverbay will repurchase the apartment
and resell it at its original cost. See Appendix, at 138a. If, for
some reason, Riverbay does not purchase the apartment the tenant
~till cannot make a profit on his sale. See pp. 3-4, supra.
18 See Rosenbaum, The Resort Condommium and the Federaf
Securities Law-a Case Study in Government Inflexibility, 60 Va . L ..
Rev. 7"85, 795-796 (1974); Casenote, 62 Georgetown L. Rev. 1515,.
1524-1526 (1974} .
17
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homeowner who pays interest on his mortgage. See
Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. § 216; Eckstein v.
United States, 452 F. 2d 1036 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
The Court of Appeals also found support for its concept of profits in the fact that Co-Op City offered space
at a cost substantially below the going rental charges
for comparable housing. This is a wholly novel
theory of "profits" and one we cannot accept. The low
rent derives from the substantial financial subsidies provided by the State of New York. This benefit cannot be
liquidated into cash; nor does it result from the managerial efforts of others. In a real sense, it no more
embodies the attributes of income or profits than do welfare benefits, food stamps or other government subsidies.
The final source of profit relied on by the Court of
Appeals was the possibility of net income derived from
the leasing by Co-Op City of commercial facilities, professional offices and parking spaces, and its operation
of community washing machines. The income, if any,
from these conveniences, all located within the common
areas of the housing proJect, is to be used to reduce
tenant rental costs. Conceptually, one might readily
agree that net income from the leasing of commercial
and professional facilities is the kind of profit traditionally associated with a security investmentY See
1'cherepnin v. Knight, supra. But in the present case
this income-if indeed there is any-is far too specula10 The "income" derived from the rental of parking spaces and the
operation of washmg machmcs clearly was not profit for respondent~; since these facilities wen' provided exclusively for the use of
tenants Thus when the income collected from the use of these
facilities exceeds the cost of the1r operation the tenants simply
receive the return of an initwl ovf'rcharge m the form of a rent
rebate.

74-157 & 74-647-0PINJON
UNITED HOUSING FOUNDATION, INC. v. FORMAN 17

tive and insubstantial to brmg the entire transaction
within the Securities Acts.
Initially we note that the prospect of such income as
a means of offsetting rental costs is never mentioned in
the Information Bulletin. Thus it is clear that investors
were not attracted to Co-Op City by the offer of these
potential rental reductions. Moreover, nothing in the
record suggests that the facilities in fact return a profit in
the sense that the leasing fees are greater than the actual
cost to Co-Op City of the space rented. 20 The short of
the matter is that the stores and services in question
were established not as a means of returning profits to
tenants, but for the purpose of making essential services
available for the residents of this enormous complex.
Without stores in which to shop, and medical and dentai
offices in which to receive treatment, this development
seeking to house 50,000 people would hardly be a viable
community. 21 By statute these facilities could only be·
"incidental and appurtenant" to the housing project,"
N. Y. Private Housing Law § 12 (5) (McKinney Suppr
1974-1975). Undoubtedly they make Co-Op City a
more attractive housing opportunity, but the possibility
of some rental reduction is not an "expectation of profit"'
in the sense found necessary in Howey 22
20 The Court of Appeals quoted the gross rental income received
from these faciliti es. But ;;uch .figures by themselves are irrelevant
since the record does not indirate the eost to Co-Op City of providing and maintaining the rented Hpace.
21 See Miller, Cooperat1ve Apartments Real E~tate or Securities?,
45 B. U. L. Rev . 4H4, 500 (191:i5).
22 Respondents urge us to abandon the element of profits in the
definition of securitic::; and to adopt the '' nsk capital" approach
articulated by the California Supreme Court m Silver Hills Country
Cl~tb v. Sobteski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P. 2d 906 (1961). Cf. Er
Khadem v Equity 8ecurtttes Corp., 494 F. 2rl 1224 (CA9 1974), .
cert. denied, 419 U .. S. 900 (1974) Se<' gmerally Coffey, The Eco-
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There is no doubt that purchasers in this housing·
cooperative sought to obtain a decent home at an attractive price. But that type of economic interest characizes every form of commercial transaction. What
distinguishes a security transaction-and what is absent
here-is an investment where one parts with his money
in the hope of receiving profits from the efforts of others,
and not where he purchases a commodity for personal
consumption or living quarters for personal use. 23
nomic Realities of a Security : Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 Case W. Res. L. Rev . 367 (1967); Long, An Attempt to
Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mamstream of Securities
Regulations, 24 Okla. L. Rev. 135 (1971); Hannan & Thomas,
The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal
Securities, 25 Hast. L. Rev. 219 (1974) . Even if we were inclined
to adopt such a "nsk capital" approach we would not apply it in
the present case. Purchasers of apartments in Co-Op City take no
risk in any significant sen~e. If di~atisfied with their apartments,
they may recover their initial investment in full. See n. 6, supra.
Respondents assert that If Co-Op City becomes bankrupt they
stand to lose their whole investment. But, in view of the fact
that the State has financed over 92% of the cost of construction
and carefully regulates the development and operation of the project,
bankruptcy in the normal sense is an unrealistic possibility. In
any event, the risk of insolvency of an ongoing housing cooperative
"differ[s] vastly" from the kind of risk of "fluctuating" value
associated with securities investments. SEC. v. Variable Annuity
Life Insurance Co., 395 U. S 65, 90-91 (1959) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). See Hannan & Thomas, supra, at 242-249; Long, Introduction to Symposium: Intrrpreting The Statutory Definition of a
Security: Some Pragmatic ConsideratiOns, 6 St. Mary's L. J. 96,
126-128 (1974) .
28 The SEC has filed an amicus brief urging us to hold the federal
securities laws applicable to this case. Traditionally the views of
an agency charged with admimstering the governing statute wot~d
be entitled to coru-nderable weight. See e. g., United States National Association of Securtttes Dealers,- U S.- (1975) (slip op.,
at 22); Saxbe v. Bmtos, 419 U.S 65, 74 (1974); Investment Company Instaute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 620-627 (1971). But in th1s
case the SEC's pos1tion flatly rontradiets what appear~ to bra rather
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III
In holding that
do not address the
fraud. Nor do we
type of claims here
eral regulations.~ 4

there is no federal jurisdiction, we
merits of respondents' allegatiOns of
indicate any view as to whether the
involved should be protected by fedWe decide only that the type of

careful statement of the Commission's views in a recent release.
In Release No. 33-5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (Jan. 18, 1973), applicable to "the sale of condominium units and other units in a real
estate development," the SEC stated its view that only those real
estate investments that are "offered and sold with emphasis on the
economic benefits to the purchaser to be derived from the managerial efforts of the promoter, or a third party designated or
arranged for by the promoter," are to be considered securities. !d.,
at 1736. In particular, the Commission explained that the Securities Acts do not apply when "commercial facilities are a part of a
residential project" if
"(a) the income from such facilities is used only to offset common area
expenses and (b) the operation of such facilities is incidental to the
project as a whole and are not established as a primary income
source for the individual owners of a. condominium or cooperative
unit." Ibid.
See also SEC Real Estate Advisory Committee Report 74-91
(1972); Dickey & Thorpe, Federal Security Regulation of Condominimum Offerings, 19 N.Y. L. F. 473 (1974) .
Several commentators have noted the inconsistency between the
SEC's position in the above release and the decision by the Court of
Appeals in this case, which the SEC now supports. See Berman
& Stone, Federal Securities Law and the Sale of Condominiums,
Homes and Homesites, 30 Bus. Law. 411, 420-425 (1975); Note,
Condominium Regulation: Beyond Disclosure, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev.
639, 654-655 (1975). In view of this unexplained contradiction in
the Commission's position we accord no special weight to its views.
See Reliance Electnc Co. v Emerson Electric Co., 404 U. S. 418,
426 (1972); Blue Chtp Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, - U. S. (1975) (shp op., at 21 n. 8).
24 It ha;; been suggested that the sale of housing developments
such as condominiums and coopPratives IS m need of federal regula tion and therefore the "ecurities laws should be construed or·
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transaction before us, in which the purchasers were interested in acquiring housing rather than making an
investment for profit, is not within the scope of the federal securities laws.
Since respondents' claims are not cognizable in federal
court, the District Court properly dismissed their complaint.25 The judgment below is therefore

Reversed.
amended to reach these transactions. See, e. g., Note, Federal Securities Regulations of Condominiums: A Purchaser's Perspective, 62
Georgetown L. J. 1403 (1974); Note, Cooperative Housing Corporations and the Federal Securities Laws, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 118 (1971).
Others have disagreed, claiming that the extensive body of regulation developed over more than four decades under these Acts would
be inappropriate and unduly costly to the sellers and buyers of residential housing. See Berman & Stone, supra, n. 23; Note, Condominimum Regulation: Beyond Disclosure, supra, n. 23. Moreover,
extension of the securities laws to real estate transactions would involve important questions as to the appropriate balance between
state and federal responsibility. The determination of whether and
in what manner federal regulation may be required for housing
transactions, where the characteristics of an investment in securities
are not present, is better left to the Congress, which can assess both
the costs and benefits of any such regulation. Indeed, only recently,
Congress instructed the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development "to conduct a full and complete investigation and study ...
with respect to . .. the problems, difficulties and abuses or potential
abuses applicable to condominium and cooperative housing." Pub.
L. 93-383, 88 Stat. 740 (Aug. 22, 1974). See also Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93---533; Interstate
Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S. C.§§ 1701-1720.
25 Besides the Securities Acts claims, respondents also included
a vague and conclusory allrgation under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against
petitioner, the New York State Housing Finance Agency. We
agree with the District Court that "the fPderal secunties allegationff
represent the only well pleaded underlying basis for jurisdiction
under [§ 1983]." 366 F . Supp., at 1132. Thus that count must
also be dismissed. The remaming counts in the complaint were all
predicated on alleged violations of state law, not independently cogniz.able in federal court.
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United Housing Foundation, Inc., et al.,
Petitioners,
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v.
Milton Forman et al.

On Writs of Certiorari to the
United States Court of
State of New York and the
Appeals for the Second
New York State HousCircuit.
ing Finance Agency,
Petitioners,
v.
74-647
Milton Forman et al.
[June - , 1975]

MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opm10n of the
Court.
The issue in this case is whether shares of stock entitling a purchaser to lease an apartment in Co-Op City,
a state subsidized and supervised nonprofit housing cooperative, are "securities" within the purview of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.
I
Co-Op City is a massive housing cooperative in New
York City. Built between 1965 and 1971, it presently
houses approximately 50,000 people on a 200-acre site
containing 35 high rise buildings and 236 town houses.
The project was organized, financed, and constructed
under the New York State Private Housing Finance Law,
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commonly known as the Mitchell-Lama Act, enacted to
ameliorate a perceived crisis in the availability of decent
low-income urban housing. In order to encourage private developers to build low cost cooperative housing,
New York provides them with large long-term, lowinterest mortgage loans and substantial tax exemptions.
Receipt of such benefits is condition.rl <n"'" a will- ingness to have the State review virtually every step in
the development of the cooperative. See N. Y. Private
Housing Finance Law §§ 11-37, as amended, (McKinney
Supp. 1974-1975). The developer also must agree to
operate the facility "on a nonprofit basis," id., at § 11-a
(2a), and he may lease apartments only to people whose
incomes fall below a certain level and who have been
approved by the State. 1
The United Housing Foundation (UHF), a nonprofit
membership corporation established for the purpose of
"aiding and encouraging" the creation of "adequate, safe
and sanitary housing accommodations for wage earners
and other persons of low and moderate income," 2 Appendix, at 95a, was responsible for initiating and sponsoring
the development of Co-Op City. Acting under the
Mitchell-Lama Act, UHF organized the Riverbay Corporation (Riverbay) to own and operate the land and
buildings constituting Co-Op City. Riverbay, a nonprofit cooperative housing corporation, issued the stock
that is the subject of this litigation. UHF also con..
Eligibility is limited to families whose monthly income does not
exceed six times the monthly rental charge (or for families of four
or more, seven times the rental charge) . N. Y. Private Housing
Finance Law§ 31 (2) (a) (McKinney Supp. 1974-1975). Preference
in admission must be given to veterans, the handicapped, and the
elderly. /d., at § 31 (7)-(9) .
2 UHF is composed of labor unions, housing cooperatives, and
civic groups. It has sponsored the construction of several major
housing cooperatives in New York City.
1
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tracted with Community Services, Inc. (CSI), its wholly
owned subsidiary, to serve as the general contractor and
sales agent for the project. 8 As required by the MitchellLama Act, these decisions were approved by the State
Housing Commissioner.
To acquire an apartment in Co-Op City an eligible
prospective purchaser must buy 18 shares of stock in
Riverbay for each room desired. The cost per share
is $25, making the total cost $450 per room, or $1,800
for a four-room apartment. The sole purpose of a.cquiring these shares is to enable the purchaser to
occupy an apartment in Co-Op City; in effect, their
purchase is a recoverable deposit on an apartment. The
shares are explicitly tied to the apartment: they cannot
be transferred to a nontenant; nor can they be pledged
or encumbered; and they descend, along with the apartment, only to a surviving spouse. No voting rights attach to the shares as such: participation in the affairs of
the cooperative appertains to the apartment, with the
residents of each apartment being entitled to one vote
irrespective of the number of shares owned.
Any tenant who wants to terminate his occupancy, or
who is forced to move out/ must offer his stoclc to Riverhay at its initial selling price of $25 per share. In the extremely unlikely event that Riverbay declines to repurchase the stock/ the tenant cannot sell it for more than
CSI is a business corporation that has acted as the contractor
on several UHF-sponsored housing cooperatives.
4 A tenant can be forced to move out if he violates the provisions
of his "occupancy agreement," which is essentially a lease for the
apartment, or if his income grows to exceed the eligibility standards.
6 To date every family that has withdrawn from Co-Op City has
received back its initial payment in full. Indeed, at the time this
suit was filed there were 7,000 families on the waiting list for apartment& in this cooperative. In addition, a special fund of nearlv
8
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the initial purchase price plus a fraction of the portion
of the mortgage that he has paid off, and then only to a
prospective tenant satisfying the statutory income eligi·
bility requirements. See N. Y. Private Housing Finance
Law § 31-a (McKinney Supp. 1974-1975).
In May 1965, subsequent to the completion of the
initial planning, Riverbay circulated an Information
Bulletin seeking to attract tenants for what would someday be apartments in Co-Op City. After describing the
nature and advantages of cooperative housing generally
and of Co-Op City in particular, the Bulletin informed
prospective tenants that the total estimated cost of the
project, based largely on an anticipated construction contract with CSI, was $283,695,550. Only a fraction of this
sum, $32,795,550, was to be raised by the sale of J
shares to tenants. The remaining $250,900,000 was to
be financed by a 40-year low-interest mortgage loan from
the New York Private Housing Finance Agency. After
construction of the project the mortgage payments and
current operating expenses would be met by monthly
rental charges paid by the tenants. While these rental
charges were to vary, depending on the size, nature, and location of an apartment, the 1965 Bulletin
estimated that the "average" monthly cost would be
$23.02 per room, or $92.08 for a four-room apartment.
Several times during the construction of Co-Op City,
Riverbay, with the approval of the State Housing Commissioner, revised its contract with CSI to allow for
increased construction costs. In addition, Riverbay
incurred other expenses that had not been reflected in the
1965 Bulletin. To meet these increased expenditures,
Riverbay, with the Commissioner's approval, repeatedly
$1 million had been established by small monthy contributions from
all tenants to insure that those wanting to move out would receive
full compensation for their shares.
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secured increased mortgage loans from the State Housing
Agency. Ultimately the construction loan was $125
million more than the figure estimated in the 1965 Bulletin. As a result, while the initial purchasing price
remained at $450 per room, the average monthly rental
charges increased periodically, reaching a figure of $39.68
per room as of July 1974.6
These increases in the rental charges precipitated the
present lawsuit. Respondents, 57 residents of Co-Op
City, sued in federal court on behalf of all 15,372 apartment owners, and derivatively on behalf of Riverbay,
seeking upwards of $30 million in damages, forced rental
reduction{ and other "appropriate" relief. Named as
defendants (petitioners herein) were UHF, CSI, Riverbay, several individual directors of these organizations, the State of New York, and the State Private
Housing Finance Agency. The heart of respondents'
claim was that the 1965 Co-Op City Information Bulletin
falsely represented that CSI would bear all subsequent
cost increases due to factors such as inflation. Respondents further alleged that they were misled in their
purchases of shares since the Information Bulletin
failed to disclose several critical facts.7 On these bases,
6 As the rental charges increased, the income eligibility requirements for residents of Co-Op City expanded accordingly. See n. 1,

sup.ra.

Respondents maintained that the following material facts were
omitted: (i) the original estimated cost had never been adhered to
in any of the previous Mitchell-Lama projects sponsored by UHF
and built by CSI ; (ii) petitioners knew that the initial estimate
would not be followed in the present project; (iii) CSI was a wholly
owned subsidiary of UHF ; (iv) CSI's net worth was so small that
it could not have been legally held to complete the contract within
the original estimated costs ; (v) the State Housing Commissioner
had waived his own rule regarding liquidity requirements in approving CSI as the contractor ; and (vi) there was an additional undis-closed contract between CSI and }f.iverbay.
7
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respondents asserted two claims under the fraud provisions of the federal Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934,
15 U. S. C. § 77q (a); 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b), and
17 CFR § 240.10b-5. They also presented a claim
against the State Financing Agency under the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S. C. § 1983, and 10 pendent state law claims.
Petitioners, while denying the substance of these allegations,8 moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that federal jurisdiction was lacking. They maintained
that shares of stock in Riverbay were not "securities"
within the definitional sections of the federal Securities
Acts. In addition, the state parties moved to dismiss on
sovereign immunity grounds.
The District Court granted the motion to dismiss.
366 F. Supp. 1117 (1973). It held that the denomination of the shares in Riverbay as "stock" did not, by
itself, make them securities under the federal acts. The
court further ruled, relying primarily on this Court's
decisions in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S.
344 (1943), and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293
(1946), that the purchase in issue was not a security
transaction since it was neither induced by an offer of
tangible material profits, nor could such profits realistically be expected. In the District Court's words, it was
·"thP- fundamental nonprofit nature of this transaction"
which presented "the insurmountable barrier to [respondents'] claims in th[e] federal court." Id., at 1128.9
8 Petitioners asserted that the Information Bulletin warned purchasers of the possibility of rental increases, and denied that it
omitted material facts. They also argued that prior to occupancy all
tenants were informed that rental charges had increased. In any
·event, petitioners claimed that respondents have suffered no damages
since they may move out and retrieve their initial investments in full.
9 The District Court also dismissed the § 1983 claim finding that
the "federar securities allegations represent the only well-pleaded
lJnderlying basis for jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act." Id.1
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.
500 F. 2d 1246 (1974). It rested its decision on two
alternative grounds. First, the court held that since the
shares purchased were called "stock" the Securities Acts,
which explicitly ir.clude "stock" in their definitional sections, were literally applicable. Second, the Court of Appeals concluded that the transaction was an investment
contract within the meaning of the Acts and as defined by
Howey, since there was an expectation of profits from
three sources: (i) rental reductions r~sulting from the
income produced by the commercial facilities established
for the use of tenants at Co-Op City; (ii) tax deductions
for the portion of the monthly rental charges allocable
to interest payments on the mortgage; and (iii) savings
based on the fact that apartments at Co-Op City cost
substantially less than comparable nonsubsidized housing. The court further ruled that the immunity claims
by the State parties were unavailing. 10 Accordingly, the
case was remanded to the District Ccurt for consideration
of respondents' claims on the merits.
In view of the importance of the issues presented we
granted certiorari. 419 U. S. 1120 (1975). As we conclude that the disputed transactions are not purchases of
securities within the contemplation of the federal statute8, we reverse.
at 1132. In view of these rulings the court did not reach the
sovereign immunity claims.
10 The Circuit Court held that the State Agency was independent
and distinct from the State itself and therefore was a "person"
for purposes of § 1983, that both the Agency and the State had
waived immunity under § 32 (5) of the Private Housing Finance
Law, and that the State had also implicitly waived its immunity by
voluntarily participating in the sale of securities, an area subject to
plenary federal regulation. See Parden v. 7'erminal Ry. of Alabama
Docks Dept., 377 U. S. 184 (1964) . In view of our disposition of
this case we do not reach these issues.
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II
The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77b (1), de'fines a "security" as
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or
other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or
"instrument commonly known as a 'security,' or any
certificate of interest or participation in, temporary
or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of
the foregoing." 11
In providing this definition Congress did not attempt to
· articulate the relevant economic criteria for distinguishing "securities" from "non-securities." Rather it sought
to define "the term 'security' in sufficiently broad and
general terms so as to include within that definition the
many types of instruments that in our commercial world
fall within the ordinary concept of a security." H. R.
Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1933). The task
has fallen to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), the body charged with administering the Securities Acts, and ultimately to the federal courts to decide
which of the myriad financial transactions in our society come within the coverage of these statutes.
:n The definition of a security in the 1934 Act is virtually identicat
and, for present purposes, the coverage of the two Acts may be
considered the same. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U . S. 332,
336, 342 (1967); S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (1934).
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In making this determination in the present case we
do not write on a clean slate. Well-settled principles
enunciated by this Court establish that the shares pur- \
chased by respondents do not represent any of the
"countless and variable schemes devised by those who
seek the use of the money of others on the promise of
profits," Howey, supra, 328 U. S., at 299, and therefore
do not fall within "the ordinary concept of a security."

A
We reject at the outset any suggestion that the present
transaction, evidenced by the sale of shares called
"stock," 12 must be considered a security transaction simply because the statutory definition of a security includes
the words "any . .. stock." Rather we adhere to the
basic principle that has guided all of the Court's decisions in this area :
"[I]n searching for the meaning and scope of the
word 'security' in the Act[s] , form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on
economic reality." Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S.
332, 336 (1967) . See also Howey, supra, 328 U. 8.,
at 298.
The primary purpose of the Securities Acts of 1933
and 1934 was to eliminate serious abuses in a largely
unregulated securities market. The focus of the Acts is
on the capital market of the enterprise system : the sale \
of securities to raise capital for profit-making purposes,
the exchanges on which securities are traded, and the
need for regulation to prevent fraud and to protect the
I

1 2 While the record does not indicate precisely why the term stock
was used for the instant transaction, it appears that this form is
generally used as a matter of tradition and convenience. See
P. Rohan & M. Reskin, Cooperative Housing Law & Practice,
§2.01 (4) (1973).
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interest of investors. Because securities transactions are
economic in character Congress intended the application
pf these statutes to turn ou the economic realities underlying a transaction, and not on the name appended
thereto. Thus, in construing these Acts against the
background of their purpose, we are guided by a traditional canon of statutory construction:
"that a thing tnay be within the ietter of the statute
:and yet not within the statute, because not within
,its spirit, nor with,in .the intention of its makers."
Church of the HoJy Trif!-ity v, United States, 143
U. S. 457, 459 (1892). See also United States v:
American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 54~
(1940). 18
Respondents' reliance on Joiner as support for a "literal approach" to defining a security is misplaced. The
issue in Joiner was whether assignments of interests in
·oil leases, coupled with the promoters' offer to drill an ex·ploratory well, were securities. Looking to the economic
~nducement provided by the proposed exploratory well,
the Court concluded that these leases were securities
even though "leases" as such were not included in the
list of instruments mentioned in the statutory definition. In dictum the Court noted that "[i]nstruments
may be included within [the definition of a security], as
[a] matter of law, if on their face they answer to the
13 With the exception of the Second Circuit, every court of ap:Peals recently to consider the issue has rejerted the literal approach
urged by respondents. SPe C. N. S. Enterprises, Inc . v. G. & G.
Enterprises, Inc., 508 F. 2d 1354 (CA7 1975); McClure v. Ji'irst National Bank of Lubbock, 497 F. 2d 490 (CAS 1974) , cert. denied, 420
U. S. 930 (1975); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F . 2d 689 (CA3
1973) . See also .} 1.· Loss-, Securities Regulation 493 (2d ed. 1961)
("substance governs rather than form : . . . just as some things
,which look like real estate are securities, some things which look like:
Securities are real estate.''),

I
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name or description." 320 U. S., at 351 (emphasis supplied) . And later, again in dictum, the Court stated
that a security "might" be shown "by proving the document itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond or
a share of stock." Id., at 355 (emphasis supplied). By
using the conditional words "may" and "might" in these
dicta the Court made clear that it was not establishing
an inflexible rule barring inquiry into the economic realities underlying a transaction. On the contrary, the
Court intended only to make the rather obvious point
that, in contrast to the instrument before it which was
not included within the explicit statutory terms, most
instruments bearing these traditional titles are likely to
be covered by the statutes. 14
In holding that the name given to an instrument is not
dispositive, we do not suggest that the name is wholly
irrelevant to the decision whether it is a security. There
may be occasions when the use of a traditional name
such as ustocks" or "bonds" will lead a purchaser justifiably to assume that the federal securities laws apply.
This would clearly be the case when the underlying
transaction embodies some of the significant characteristics typically associated with the named instrument.
In the present case respondents do not contend, nor
could they, that they were misled by use of the word
"stock" into believing that the federal securities laws governed their purchase. Common sense suggests that peo14 Nor can respondents derive any support for a literal approach
from Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra, which quoted the Joiner dictum .
Indeed in Tcherepnin the Court explicitly stated that "form should
be disregardf'd for substance," id., at 336, and only after analyzing
the economic realities of the transaction at issue did it conclude that
an instrument called a "withdrawable capital share" was, in substance, an "investment contract," a share of "stock," a "certificate
of interest or participation in a profit sharing agreement," and a
4
'transferable share,"
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ple who intend to acquire only a residential apartment in
a state-subsidized cooperative, for their personal use, are
not likely to believe that in reality they are purchasing
investment securities simply because the transaction is
evidenced by something called a share of stock. These
shares have none of the characteristics "that in our com-~
mercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security." H. R. Rep. No. 85, supra, at 11. Despite their
name, they lack what the Court in Tcherepnin deemed
the most common feature of stock: the right to receive
"dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits."
289 U. S., at 339. Nor do they possess the other characteristics traditionally associated with stock: they are not
negotiable; they cannot be pledged or hypothecated;
they confer no voting rights in proportion to the number
of shares owned; and they cannot appreciate in value.
In short, the inducement to purchase was solely to acquire subsidized low-cost living space; it was not to
invest for profit.

B
The Court of Appeals, as an alternative ground for its
decision, concluded that a share in Riverbay was also an
"investment contract" as defined by the Securities Acts.
Respondents further argue that in. any event what they
agreed to purchase is ''commonly known as a 'security'"
within the meaning of these laws. In considering these
claims, we again must examine the substance-the
economic realities of the transaction-rather than the
names that may have been employed by the parties.
We perceive no distinction, for present purposes, between an "investment contract" and an "instrument commonly known as a security.'' In either case, the basic
test for distinguishing the transaction from other commercial dealings is
61
whether the scheme involves an investment of
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money in a common enterprise with profits to come
solely from the efforts of others." Howey, supra,
328 U. S., at 301.15
This test, in shorthand form, embodies the essential attributes that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security. The touchstone is the presence of an
investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entreprenurial or managerial efforts of others. By profits, the
Court has meant either capital appreciation resulting
from the development of the initial investment, as in
Joiner, supra (sale of oil leases conditioned on promoters'
agreement to drill exploratory well), or a participation in
earnings resulting frotn the use of investors' funds, as in
Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra (dividends on the investment based on savings and loan association's profits).
In such caees the mvestor is 11 attracted solely by the prospects of a return" on his investment. Howey, supra,
328 U. S., at 300. By contrast, when a purchaser is
motivated by a desire to use or consume the item purchased-"to occupy the land or to develop it themselves,"
as the Howey Court put it, 328 U. S., at 300-the securities laws do not apply.16 See Joiner, supra. 11
This test speak<> in terms of "profits to come solely from the
efforts of others." (Emphasis supplied.) Although the issue is not
presented in this case, we note that the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit ha~ held that "the word "solely' should not be read
as a strict or literal limitation of the definition of an investment
contract, but rather must be construed realistically, so as to include
within the definition those schemes which involve in substance, if
not form, securities." SEC v. Glenn Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474
F. 2d 476,482 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 821 (1973) .
·w ln some transactions the investor is offered both a commodity or
real estate for use and an expectation of profits. See SEC Release
No. 33-5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (Jan. 18, 1973). See generally
[Footnote 17 i& em p.
15

t.n
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In the present case there can be no doubt that investors
were attracted solely by the prospect of acquiring a place
to live, and not by financial returns on their investments. ·The Information Bulletin distributed to prospective residents emphasized the fundamental nature and
·purpose of the undertaking:
"A cooperative is a nonprofit enterprise owned
and controlled democratically by its members-the
people who are using its services....
"People find living in a cooperative community
enjoyable for more than one reason. Most people
join, however, for the simple reason that it is a way
to obtain decent housing at a reasonable price.
However, there are other advantages. The purpose
of a cooperative is to provide home ownership, not
just apartments to rent. The community is designed to provide a favorable environment for family
and community living....
"The common bond of collective ownership which
you share makes living in a cooperative different.
It is a community of neighbors. Home ownership,
Rohan, The Securities Law Implications of Condominium Marketing
Programs Which Feature a Rental Agency or Rental Pool, 2 Conn.
L. Rev. 1 (1969). The application of the federal securities laws to
these transactions may raise difficult questions that are not present
in this case.
1 7 In Jmner, the Court stated:
"Undisputed facts seem to us, however, to establish the conclusion
that defendants were not, as a practical matter, offering naked
leasehold rights. Had the offer mailed by defendants omitted the
economic inducements of the proposed and promised exploration
well, it would have been quite a different proposition." 320 U. S.,
at 348.
This distinction was critical because the exploratory drillings gave
the investments "most of their value and all of their lure." /d.,
at 349. The land itself was purely an incidental consideration in
the transaction.
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common interests and the community atmosphere
make living in a cooperative like living in a small
town. As a rule there is very little turnover in · a
cooperative." Appendix, at 162ar-166a.
Nowhere does the Bulletin seek to attract investors by
the prospect of profits resulting from the efforts of the
promoters or third parties. On the contrary, the Bulletin
repeatedly emphasizes the "nonprofit" nature of the en~
deavor. It explains that if rental charges exceed expenses the difference will be returned as a rebate, not
invested for profit. It also informs purchasers that they
will be unable to resell their apartments at a profit since
the apartment must first be offered back to Riverbay "at
the price . . . paid for it." 18 I d., at 162a. In short,
neither of the kinds of profits traditionally associated
with securities were offered to respondents.
The Court of Appeals recognized that there must be
an expectation of profits for these shares to be securities,
and conceded that there is.uno possible profit on a resale
of [this] stock." 500 F . 2d, at 1254. The court correctly noted, however, that profit may be derived from
the income yielded by an investment as well as from
capital appreciation, and then proceeded to find "an
expectation of 'income' in at least three ways." Ibid.
Two of these supposed sources of income or profits may
be disposed of summarily. We t urn first to the Court
of Appeals' reliance on the deductibility for tax purposes
of the portion of the monthly rental charge applied to
18 This requirement effectively insures that no apartment will be
sold fo r more t han its original cost. Consonant with the purposes
of the Mitchell-Lama Act, whenever there are prospective buyers
willing to pay as much as the imtial purchase price for an
apartment in Co-Op City, Riverbay will repurchase the apartment
and resell it at its origmal cost. See Appendix, at 138a. If, for
some reason, Riverbay does not purchase t he apartment t he tenant
still cann.ot make a profit on his sale. See pp. 3-4, supra.
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interest on the mortgage. We know of no basis in law
for the view that the payment of interest, with its con ..
sequent deductibility for tax purposes, constitutes in-.
come or profits.19 These tax benefits are nothing more
than that which is available to any homeowner who pays
interest on his mortgage. See Internal Revenue Code,
26 U. S. C. § 216; Eckstein v. United States, 452 F. 2d
1036 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
The Court of Appeals also found support for its con~
cept of profits in the fact that Co-Op City offered space
at a cost substantially below the going rental charges
for comparable housing. Again, this is an inappropriate
theory of "profits" that we cannot accept. The low 1
rent derives from the substantial financial subsidies provided by the State of New York. This benefit cannot be
liquidated into cash; nor does it result from the managerial efforts of others. In a real sense, it no more
embodies the attributes of income or profits than do welfare benefits, food stamps or other government subsidies.
The final source of profit relied on by the Court of
Appeals was the possibility of net income derived from
the leasing by Co-Op City of commercial facilities, professional offices and parking spaces, and its operation
of community washing machines. The income, if any,
from these conveniences, all located within the common
areas of the housing project, is to be used to reduce
tenant rental costs. Conceptually, one might readily
agree that net income from the leasing of commercial
and professional facilities is the kind of profit tra10 Even if these tax deductions were considered profits, they would
not be the type associated with a security investment since they do
not result from the managerial efforts of others·. See Rosenbaum,
The Resort Condominium and the Federal Securities Law-A Case·
Study in Government Inflexibility, 60 Va. L. Rev. 785, 795-79&
(1974); Casenote, 62 Georgetown L. Rev. 1515,1524-1526 (1974) .

I
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ditionally associated with a security investment. 20 See
Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra. But in the present case
this income-if indeed there is any-is far too speculative and insubstantial to bring the entire transaction
within the Securities Acts.
Initially we note that the prospect of such income as
a means of offsetting rental costs is never mentioned in
the Information Bulletin. Thus it is clear that investors
were not attracted to Co-Op City by the offer of these
potential rental reductions. See Joiner, supra, 320 U. S.,
at 353. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that
the facilities in fact return a profit in the sense that the
leasing fees are greater than the actual cost to Co-Op /.
. ~
21
City of the space rented.
The short of the matter is ~
that the stores and services in question were established
not as a means of returning profits to tenants, but for
the purpose of making essential services available for the
residents of this enormous complex. 22 By statute these
facilities can only be "incidental and appurtenant" to the
20 The "income" derived from the rental of parking spaces and the
operation of washing machines clearly was not profit for respondents since these facilities were provided exclusively for the use of
tenants. Thns when the income collected from the use of these
facilities exceeds the cost of their operation the tenants simply
receive the· return of the initial overcharge in the form of a rent
rebate·. Indeed, it could be argued that the "income" from the·
commercial and professional facilities is also, in effect, a rebate on
the cost of goods and services purchas('d at these facilities since it
appears likely that they are patronized almost exclusively by Co-Op
City residents. See Casenote, 53 Tex. L. Rev. 623, 630-631 n. 38:
(1975).
21 The Court of Appeals quoted the gross rental income received
from these facilities. But such figures by themselves are irrelevant
since the record does not indicate the cost to Co-Op City of providing and maintaining the rented space.
22 See Miller, Cooperative Apartments ; l{eal Eetate or Securities?,
45 B. U. L. Rev. 464,500 (1960}.
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housing project, N. Y. Private Housing Law § 12 (5)
(McKinney Supp. 1974-1975). Undoubtedly they make
Co-Op City a more attractive housing opportunity, but
the possibility of some rental reduction is not an "expectation of profit" in the sense found necessary in Howey. 23
There is no doubt that purchasers in this housing
cooperative sought to obtain a decent home at an attrac~
tive price. But that type of economic interest characizes every form of commercial dealing. What distinguishes a security transaction-and what is absent
Respondents urge us to abandon the element of profits in the
definition of securities and to adopt the "risk capital" approach
articulated by the California Supreme Court in Silver Hills Country
Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. '2d 811, 361 P. 2d 906 (1961). Cf. El
Khadem v. Equity Securities Corp., 494 F. 2d 1224 (CA9 1974),.
cert. denied, 419 U. S. 900 (1974). See generally Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 Case W. Res. L. Re". 367 (1967); Long, An Attempt to
Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream oi Securities·
Regulation, 24 Okla. L. Rev. 135 (1971); Hannan & Thomas,
The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal
Securities, 25 Hast. L. Rev . 219 (1973). Even if we were inclined:
to adopt such a "risk capital" approach we would not apply it in
the present case. Purcha,sers of apartments in Co-Op City take no
risk in any significant sense. If dissatisfied with their apartments,.
they may recover their initial investment in full. See n. C supra.
Respondents assert that if Co-Op City becomes bankrupt they
stand to lose their whole investment. But, in view of the fact
that the State has financed over 92% of the cost of construction
and carefully regulates the development and operation of the project,
bankruptcy in the normal sense is an unrealistic possibility. In
any event, the risk of insolvency of an ongoing housing cooperative
"differ[s] vastly" from the kind of risk of "fluctuating" value
associated with securities investments. SEC. v. Variable Annuity
Life Insurance Co., 359 U. S. 65, 90-91 (1959) (BRENNAN, J., con-·
curring) . See Hannan & Thomas, supra, at 242-249; Long, Introduction to Symposium : Interpreting The Statutory Definition of a
Security: Some Pragmatic Considerations, 6 St. Mary's L. J. 96.,.
126-128 (1974).
28
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here-is an investment where one parts with his money
in the hope of receiving profits from the efforts of others,
and not where he purchases a commodity for personal
consumption or living quarters for personal use. 24
The SEC has filed an amicus brief urging us to hold the federal
securities laws applicable to this case. Traditionally the views of
an agency charged with administering the governing statute would
be entitled to considerable weight. See, e. g., United States National Association of Securities Dealers,- U.S.- (1975) (slip op.,
at 22); Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U. S. 65, 74 (1974); Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626--627 (1971). But in this
case the SEC's position flatly contradicts what appears to be a rather
careful statement of the Commission's views in a recent release.
In Release No. 33-5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (Jan. 18, 1973), applicable to "the sale of condominium units and other units in a real
estate development," the SEC stated its view that only those real
estate investments that are "offered and sold with emphasis on the
economic benefits to the purchaser to be derived from the managerial efforts of the promotf'!r, or a third party designated or
arranged for by the promoter," are to be considered securities. !d.,
at 1736. In particular, the Commission explained that the Securities Acts do not apply when "commercial facilities are a part of the
common elements of a residential project" jf
"(a) the income from such facilities is used only to offset common area
expenses and (b) the operation of such facilities is incidental to the
projf'!ct as a whole and are not established as a primary income
source for the individual owners of a condominium or cooperative
unit." Ibid.
See abo SEC Real Estate Advisory Committee Report 74-91
(1972); Dickey & Thorpe, Federal Security Regulation of Condominium Offerings, 19 N.Y. L. F. 473 (1974).
Several commentators have noted the inconsistency between the
SEC's position in the above release and the decision by the Court of
Appeals in this case, which the SEC now supports. See Berman
& Stone, Federai Securities Law and the Sale of Condominiums,
Homes and Homesites, 30 Bus. Law. 411, 420-425 (1975); Note,
Condominium Regulation : Beyond Disclosure, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev.
639, 654--655 (1975); Casenote, supra, 11. 20, at 628. In view of this
unexplained contradiction# in the Commission's position we accord
no special weight to its views. See R eliance Electric Co. v. Emerson.
24
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III
In holding that there is no federal jurisdiction, we
do not address the merits of respondents' allegations of
fraud. Nor do we indicate any view as to whether the
type of claims here involved should be protected by federal regulations. 25 We decide only that the type of
transaction before us, in which the purchasers were interested in acquiring housing rather than making an
investment for profit, is not within the scope of the federal securities laws.
Electric Co., 404 U.S. 418, 426 (1972); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Dru,g Stores,- U.S.- (1975) (slip op., at 21 n. 8).
25 It has been suggested that the sale of housing developments
such as condominiums and cooperatives is in need of federal regulation and therefore the securities laws should be construed or
amended to reach these transactions. See, e. g., Note, Federal Securities Regulations of Condominiums: A Purchaser's Perspective, 62
Georgetown L. J. 1403 (1974); Note, Cooperative Housing Corporations and the Federal Securities Laws, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 118 (1971).
Others have disagreed, claiming that the extensive body of regulation developed over more than four decades under these Acts would
be inappropriate and unduly costly to the sellers and buyers of residential housing. See Berman & Stone, supra, n. 24; Casenote, supra,
n. 20. Moreover, extension of the securities laws to real estate
transnctions would involve important questions as to the appropriate
balance between state and federal responsibility. The determination
of whether and in what manner federal regulation may be required
for housing transactions, where the characteristics of an investment
~llBB l!e!h ths oo11*s nnd honofi€s ef IU!:) etteh 1e~ttl:ation. l!!Eisoa,,
in securities are not present, is better left to the Congress, which can
assess both the costs and benefits of any such regulation. Indeed
only recently, Congress imrtructed the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development "to conduct a full and complete investigation
and study . .. with respect to . . . the problems, difficulties and
abuses or potential abuses applicable to condominium and cooperative housing." Pub. L. 93-3&1, 88 Stat. 740 (Aug. 22, 1974) . See
also Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, Pub. L. Nt 93-533
(Dec. 22, 1974); Interstate Land. Sales Full Disclosure Ac U. S. C.
§~ 1701-17.2.0 ..

/
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Since respondents' claims are not cognizable in federal
court, the District Court properly dismissed their complant.2'6 The judgment below is therefore
Reversed.
MR. JFSTICE DouGLAS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Besides the Securities Acts claims, respondents also included
a vague and conclusory allegation under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against
petitioner, the New York State Housing Finance Agency. We
agree with the District Court that this count must also be dismissed . ,
See n. 9, supra. The remaining counts in the complaint were all
predicated on alleged violations of state law, not independently cognizable in federal court.
20
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The issue in this case is whether shares of stock entitling a purchaser to lease an apartment in Co-Op City,
a state subsidized and supervised nonprofit housing cooperative, are ((securities" within the purview of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.
][

Co-Op City is a massive housing cooperative in New
York City. Built between 1965 and 1971, it presently
houses approximately 50,000 people on a 200-acre site
containing 35 high rise buildings and 236 town houses.
The project was organized, financed, and constructed
under the New York State Private Housing Finance Law,
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commonly known as the Mitchell-Lama Act, enacted tO'
ameliorate a perceived crisis in the availability of decent
low-income urban housing. In order to encourage private developers to build low-cost cooperative housing,
New York provides them with large long-term, low.,
interest mortgage loans and substantial tax exemptions.
Receipt of such be11efits is conditioned on a will ~
ingness to have the State review virtually every step in
the development of the cooperative. See N. Y. Private
Housing Finance Law§§ 11-37, as amended, (McKinney
Supp. 1974-1975) . The developer also must agree to·
operate the facility "on a nonprofit basis," id., at § 11- a
(2a), and he may lease apartments only to people whose
incomes fall below a certain level and who have been
approved by the State.1
The United Housing Foundation (UHF), a nonprofit
membership corporation established for the purpose of
'~aiding and encouraging" the creation of "adequate, safe
and sanitary housing accommodations for wage earners
&nd other persons of low and moderate income," 2 Appenw
dix, at 95a, was responsible for initiating and sponsoring
the development of Co-Op City. Acting under the
Mitchell-Lama Act, UHF organized the Riverbay Cor.,
poration (Riverbay) to own and operate the land and
buildings constituting Co-Op City. Riverbay, a nonprofit cooperative housing corporation, issued the stock
that is the subject of this litigation. UHF also con~
Eligibility is limited to families whose monthly income does not
exceed six times the monthly rental charge (or for families of four
or more, seven times the rental charge). N. Y Private Housing
Finance Law§ 31 (2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1974-1975). Preference
in admission must be given to veterans, the handicapped, and the
elderly. /d., at § 31 (7)- (9) .
2 UHF is composed of labor unions, hou~ing cooperatives, and
civic groups. It. has sponsored the construction of several major
housing cooperatives in New York City.
1

74-157 & 74-647-0PINION
UNITED HOUSING FOUNDATION, INC. v. FORMAN

3

tracted with Community Services, Inc. (CSI), its wholly
owned subsidiary, to serve as iihe general contractor and
sales agent for the project.8 As required by the MitchellLama Act, these decisions were approved by the State
Housing Commissioner,
To acquire an apartment in Co-Op City an eligible
prospective purchaser must buy 18 shares of stock in
Riverbay for each room desired. The cost per share
is $25, making the total cost $450 per room, or $1,800
for a four-room apartment. The sole purpose of acquiring these shares is to enable the purchaser to
occupy an apartment in Co-Op City; in effect, their
purchase is a recoverable deposit on an apartment. The
shares are explicitly tied to the apartment: they cannot
be transferred to a nontenant; nor can they be pledged
or encumbered; and they descend, along with the apartment, only to a surviving spouse. No voting rights at~
tach to the shares as such : participation in the affairs of
the cooperative appertains to the apartment, with the
residents of each apartment being entitled to one vote
irrespective of the number of shares owned.
Any tenant who wants to terminate his occupancy, or
who is forced to move out/ must offer his stock to Riverbay at its initial selling price of $25 per share. In the extremely unlikely event that Riverbay declines to repur~
chase the stock, 5 the ten~:tnt cannot sell it for more than
3

CSI is a business corporation that has acted as the contractor
on several UHF-sponsored housing cooperatives.
4 A tenant can be forced to move out if he violates the provisions
of his "occupancy agreement," which is essentially a lease for the
apartment, or if his income grows to exceed the eligibility standards.
6 To date every family that has withdrawn from Co-Op C1ty has
received back its initial payment in full. Indeed, at the time thu~
suit was filed there were 7,000 families on the waiting list for apartments in this cooperative. In a.dd.it10n, a special fund of nearhr
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the initial purchase price plus a fraction of the portion
of the mortgage that he has paid off, and then only to a
prospective tenant satisfying the statutory income eligi"'·
bility requirements. SeeN. Y" Private Housing Finance·
Law § 31-a (McKinney Supp. 1974-1975).
In May 1965, subsequent to the completion of the
initial planning, Riverbay circulated an Information
Bulletin seeking to attract tenants for what would some. day be apartments in Co-Op City. After describing the·
nature and advantages of cooperative housing generally
- and of Co-Op City in particular, the Bulletin informed
prospective tenants that the total estimated cost of the
project, based largely on an anticipated construction con~
tract with CSI, was $283,695,550. Only a fraction of this
Bum, $32,795,550, was to be raised by the sale of
shares to tenants. The remaining $250,900,000 was to
be financed by a 40-year low-interest mortgage loan from
'the New York Private Housing Finance Agency. After
'construction of the project the mortgage payments and
·current operating expenses would be met by monthly
rental charges paid by the tenants. While these rental
·charges were to vary, depending on the size, na~
ture, and location of an apartment, the 1965 Bulletin
·estimated that the "average" monthly cost would be
$23.02 per room, or $92.08 for a four-room apartment.
Several times during the construction of Co-Op City,
Riverbay, with the approval of the State Housing Commissioner, revised its contract with CSI to allow for
increased construction costs. In addition, Riverbay
incurred other expenses that had not been reflected in the
1965 Bulletin. To meet these increased expenditures,
Riverbay, with the Commissioner's approval, repeatedly
$1 million had been established by small monthy contributions from
all tenants to inr.ure that those wanting to move out would receive
full compensation for their shares.
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secured increased mortgage loans from the State Housing
Agency. Ultimately the construction loan was $125
million more than the figure estimated in the 1965 Bulletin. As a result, while the initial purchasing price
remained at $450 per room, the average monthly rental
charges increased periodically, reaching a figllre of $39.68
per room as of July 1974.6
These increases in the rental charges precipitated the
present lawsuit. Respondents, 57 residents of Co-Op
City, sued in federal court on behalf of all 15,372 apart~
ment owners, and derivatively on behalf of Riverbay,
seeking upwards of $30 million in damages, forced rental
reductions, and other "appropriate" relief. Named M
defendants (petitioners herein) were UHF, CSI, Riverbay, several individual directors of these organiza~
tions, the State of New York, and the State Private
Housing Finance Agency. The heart of respondents*
claim was that the 1965 Co-Op City Information Bulletin
falsely represented that CSI would bear all subsequent
cost increases due to factors such as inflation. Respond..
ents further alleged that they were misled in their
purchases of shares since the Information Bulletin
failed to disclose several critical facts.7 On these bases,
6 As the rental charges increased, the income eligibility requirements for residents of Co-Op City expanded accordingly. See n. 1,
supra.
7 Respondents maintained that the following material facts were
omitted: (i) the original estimated cost had never been adhered to
in any of the previous Mitchell-Lama projects sponsored by UHF
and built by CSI ; (ii) petitioners knew that the initial estimate
would not be fOllowed in the present project; (hi) CSI was a wholly
owned subsidiary of UHF ; (iv) CSI's net worth was so small that
it could not 'have been legally held to complete the contract within
the original estimated costs; (v) the State Housing Commissioner
had waived his own rule regardmg liquidity requirements in approving CSI as the contractor; and (vi) there was an additional undis..
closed contract between CSI and Riverbay.
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respondents asserted two claims under the fraud pro..
visions of the federal Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934,
15 U. S. C. § 77q (a); 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b), and
17 CFR § 240.10b-5. They also presented a claim
~ainst the State Financing Agency under the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and ' 10 pendent state law claims.
Petitioners, while denying the substance of these alleg.ations,8 moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that federal jurisdiction was lacking. They maintained
that shares of stock in Riverbay were not "securities"
within the definitional sections of the federal Securities
Acts. In addition, the state parties moved to dismiss on
sovereign immunity grounds.
The District Court granted the motion to dismiss.
366 F. Supp. 1117 (1973). It held that the denomination of the shares in Riverbay as "stock" did not, by
itself, make them securities under the federal Acts. The
court further ruled, relying primarily on this Court's
decisions in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing CO'I'p., 320 U.S.
·344 (1943), and SEC·v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293
(1946), that the purchase in issue was not a security
transaction since it was neither induced by an offer of
tangible material profits, nor could such profits realistically be expected. In the District Court's words, it was
"the fundamental nonprofit nature of this transaction"
which presented "the insurmountable barrier to [respondents'] claims in th[e] federal court." !d., at 1128.9
8

Petitioners asserted that the Information Bulletin warned purcthasers of the possibility of rental increases, and dt>nied that it
qmitted material facts. They also argued that pnor 1o occupancy all
tenants were informed that rental charges had increased. In any
event, petitioners claimed that respondents have suffered no damages
since they may move out and retrieve their uutial investments in full.
8 The District Court also dismissed the § 1983 claim finding that
the "federat securities allegations represent the only well-pleaded
underlying basis for jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act." ld,
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.
500 F. 2d 1246 (1974). It rested its decision on two
alternative grounds. First, the court held that since the
shares purchased were called "stock" the Securities Acts,
which explicitly include "stock" in their definitional sect ions, were literally applicable. Second, the Court of Appeals concluded that the transaction was an investment
contract within the meaning of the Acts and as defined by
Ho wey, since there was an expectation of profits from
three sources: ( i) rental reductions resulting from the
income produced by the commercial facilities established
for the use of tenants at Co-Op City; (ii) tax deductions
for the portion of the monthly rental charges allocable
to interest payments 0n the mortgage; and (iii) savings
based on the fact that apartments at Co-Op City cost
substantially less than comparable nonsubsidized housing. The court further ruled that the immunity claims
by the State parties were unavailing. 10 Accordingly, the
case was remanded to the District Court for consideration
of respondents' claims on the merits.
In view of the importance of the issues presented we
granted certiorari. 419 U. S. 1120 (1975). As we cone
elude that the disputed transactions are not purchases of
securities within the contemplation of the federal statutes, we reverse.
at 1132. In view of these rulings the court did not reach the
sovereign immunity claims.
10 The Circuit Court held that the State Agency was independent
and distinct from the State itself and therefore was a "person"
for purposes of § 1983, that both the Agency and the State had
waived immunity under § 32 (5) of the Private Housing Finance
Law, and that the State had also implic1tly waived its immunity by
voluntarily participating in the sale of securities, an area subject to
plenary federal regulation. Set> Parden v Terminal Ry. of Alabama
Docks Dept., 377 U. S. 184 (1964) . In view of our disposition of
this case we do not reach these issues
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The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77b (1), de"'
fines a "security" as
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral:.trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or
other · mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a 'security,' or any
certificate of interPst or participation in, temporary
or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of
the foregoing." 11
Ih providing this definition Congress did not attempt to
articulate the relevant economic criteria for distinguishing "securities" from "non-securities." Rather it sought
to define "the term 'security' in sufficiently broad and
general terms so as to include within that definition the
many types of instruments that in our commercial world
fall within the ordinary concept of a security." H. R.
Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1933). The task
has fallen to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), the body charged with administering the Securi=
ties Acts, and ultimately to the federal courts to decide
which of the myriad financial transactions in our s<F
ciety come within the coverage of these statutes.
11 The definition of a security in the 1934 Act is virtually identicat
and, for present purposes, the coverage of the two Acts may be
considered the same. See Tcherepnin v. Kmght, 389 U. S. 332,
.'386, 342 (1967); S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (1934) •.
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In making this determination in the present case we
do not write on a clean slate. Well-settled principles
enunciated by this Court establish that the shares purchased by respondents do not represent any of the
"countless and variable schemes devised by those who
seek the use of the money of others on the promise of
profits," Howey, supra, 328 U. S., at 299, and therefore
do not fall within "the ordinary concept of a security."
A
We reject at the outset any suggestion that the present
transaction, evidenced by the sale of shares called
"stock," 12 must be considered a security transaction simply because the statutory definition of a security includes
the words "any ... stock." Rather we adhere to the
basic principle that has guided all of the Court's deci~
sions in this area:
"[I]n searching for the meaning and scope of the
word 'security' in the Act[s], form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on
economic reality." Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S.
332, 336 (1967). See also Howey, supra, 328 U. S.,
at 298.

The primary purpose of the Securities Acts of 1933
and 1934 was to eliminate serious abuses in a largely
unregulated securities market. The focus of the Acts is
on the capital market of the enterprise system: the sale
of securities to raise capital for profit-making purposes,
the exchanges on which securities are traded, and the
need for regulation to prevent fraud and to protect the
12

While the record does not indicate precisely why the term stock
was used for the instant transaction, it appears that this form is
generally used as a matter of tradition and convenience. See
P. Rohan & M. Reskin, CooperatJVl' Hou~mg Law & PrartiC~
§ 2.01 (4) (1973) •

..
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interest of investors. Because securities transactions are
economic in character Congress intended the application
of these statutes to turn on the economic realities under~
lying a transaction, and not on the name appended
thereto. Thus, in construing these Acts against the
background of their purpose, we are guided by a tradi-"
tional canon of statutory com~truction :
"that a thing may be within the letter of the statute
and yet not within the statute, because not within
its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers."
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143
U. S. 457, 459 (1892) . See also United States v.
American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 543
(1940). 18
Respondents' reliance on Joiner as support for a "lit~
eral approach" to defining a security is misplaced. The
issue in Joiner was whether assignments of interests in
oil leases, coupled with the promoters' offer to drill an exploratory well, were securities. Looking to the economic
inducement provided by the proposed exploratory well,
the Court concluded that these leases were securities
even though "leases'' as such were not included in the
list of instruments mentioned in the statutory definition. In dictum the Court noted that "[i] nstruments
may be included within [the definition of a security], as
[a] matter of law, if on their face they answer to the
18 With the exception of the Second Circuit, every court of appeals recently to consider the issue has rejected the literal approach
urged by respondents. See C. N. S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G.
Enterprises, Inc., 508 F. 2d 1354 (CA7 1975); McClure v. First National Bank of Lubbock, 497 F. 2d 490 (CAS 1974), cert. denied, 420
U. S. 930 (1975); Lino v City Investing Co., 487 F 2d 689 (CA3
1973). See also 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 493 (2d ed. 1961)
("substance governs rather than fo rm · . . . just as some things
which look like rral estate are secuntles, some things which look like
:securities are real estate.").
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name or description." 320 U. S., at 351 (emphasis supplied). And later, again in dictum, the Court stated
that a security "might" be shown "by proving the document itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond or
a share of stock." !d., at 355 (emphasis supplied) . By
using the conditional words "may" and "might" in these
dicta the Court made clear that it was not establishing
an inflexible rule barring inquiry into the economic realities underlying a transaction. On the contrary, the
Court intended only to make the rather obvious point
that, in contrast to the instrument before it which was
not included within the explicit statutory terms, most
instruments bearing these traditional titles are likely to
be covered by the statutes.14
In holding that the name given to an instrument is not
dispositive, we do not suggest that the name is wholly
irrelevant to the decision whether it is a security. There
may be occasions when the use of a traditional name
such as "stocks" or "bonds" will lead a purchaser justifiably to assume that the federal securities laws apply.
This would clearly be the case when the underlying
transaction embodies some of the significant character~
istics typically associated with the named instrument.
In the present case respondents do not contend, nor
cuuld they, that they were misled by use of the word
~'stock" into believing that the federal securities laws governed their purchase. Common sense suggests that peoNor can respondents derive any support for a literal approach
from Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra, which quoted tlJe Joiner dictum.
Indeed in Tche1·epnin the Court explicitly stated that "form should
be disregarded for substance," id., at 336, and only after analyzing
the economic realities of the transaction at issue did it conclude that
an instrument called a "withdrawable capital share" was, in substance, an "investment contract," a share of "stock,'' a "certificateof interest or participation in a profit sharing agreement," and a.
~'transferable share."
14
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ple who intend to acquire only a residential apartment in
a state-subsidized cooperative, for their personal use, are
not likely to believe that in reality they are purchasing
investment securities simply because the transaction is
evidenced by something called a share of stock. These
shares have none of the characteristics "that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security." H. R. Rep. No. 85, supra, at 11. Despite thmr
name, they lack what the Court in Tcherepnin deemed
the most common feature of stock: the right to receive
"dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits"
289 U.S., at 339. Nor do they possess the other characteristics traditionally associated with stock: they are not
negotiable; they cannot be pledged or hypothecated;
they confer no voting rights in proportion to the number
of shares owned; and they cannot appreciate in value,
In short, the inducement to purchase was solely to acquire subsidized low-cost living space; it was not to
invest for profit.
B
The Court of Appeals, as an alternative ground for its
decision, concluded that a share in Riverbay was also an
"investment contract" as defined by the Securities Acts,
Respondents further argue that in any event what they
agreed to purchase is "commonly known as a 'security'"
within the meaning of these laws. In considering these
claims we again must exanune the substance-the
economic realities of the transaction-rather than the
names that may have been employed by the parties.
We perceive no distinction, for present purposes, be~
tween an "investment contract" and an "instrument commonly known as a security." In either case, the basic
test for distinguishing the transaction from other commercial dealings is
«'whether the scheme involves an investment of

:
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money in a common enterprise with profits to come
solely from the efforts of others." Howey, supra,
328 U. S., at 30J.l 5
This test, in shorthand form, embodies the essential attributes that run through all of the Court's deciEJions defining a security. The touchstone is the presence of an
investment in e common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entreprenurial or managerial efforts of others. By profits, the
Court has meant either capital appreciation resulting
from the development of the initial investment, as in
Joiner, supra (sale of oil leases conditioned on promoters'
agreement to drill exploratory well), or a participation in
earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds, as in
Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra (dividends on the investment based on savings and loan association's profits).
In such cases the investor is "attracted solely by the prospects of a return" on his investment. Howey, supra,
328 U. S., at 300. By contrast, wl1en a purchaser is
motivated by a desire to use or consume the item purchased-"to occupy the land or to develop it themselves,"
as the Howey Court put it, 328 U. S., at 300-the securities laws do not apply 16 See also J o·iner, supra.17
15 This test speaks in terms of "profits to come solely from the
efforts of others." (Emphasis supplied.) Although the issue is not
presented in this case, we notll that the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit has held that ''the word 'solely' should not be read.
as a strict or literal limitation of the definition of an investment
contract, but rather must be construed realistically, so as to mclude
within the definition those schemes which involve in substance, if
not form, securities." SEC v. Glenn Turner E.nterprises, Inc ., 474 1
F. 2d 476, 482 (197:3) , cert. denied, 414 U S 821 (1973) . We ex·
press no view, however, a::; to the holdmg of thu; case.
u In some transactions the investor is offered both a commodity or
Teal estate for use and an expectation of profits. See SEC Release
NQ, .33-5347, 3.8 Fed. Reg. 1735 (Jan. 18, 1973)
See generally
[Footnote 17 is on p . 14]
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In the present case there can be no doubt that investors
were attracted solely by the prospect of acquiring a place
to live, and not by financial returns on their investments. The Information Bulletin distributed to pros-pective residents emphasized the fundamental nature and
purpose of the undertakmg:
"A cooperative is a nonprofit enterprise owned
and controlled democratically by its members-the
people who are using its services....
"People find living in a cooperative community
enjoyable for more than one reason. Most people
join, however, for the simple reason that it is a way
to obtain decent housing at a reasonable price.
However, there are other advantages. The purpose
of a cooperative is to provide home ownership, not
just apartments to rent. The community is designed to provide a favorable environment for family
·and community living....
"The common bond of collective ownership which
you share makes living in a cooperative different.
It is a community of neighbors. Home ownership,
Rohan, The Securities Law Implications of Condominium Marketing
Programs WhiCh Feature a Rental Agency or Rental Pool, 2 Conn.
L. Rev. 1 (1969). The applicatiOn of the federal securities laws to
these transactions may raise difficult questions that are not present
in this case.
1 7 In Joiner, the Court stated :
"Undisputed facts seem to us, however, to establish the conclusion
that defendants were not, as a practical matter, offering naked
leasehold rights. Had the offer mailed by defendants omitted the
economic inducements of the proposed and promised exploratioiJ
well, it would have been quite a d1fferP-nt proposition." 320 U. S.,
at 348.
This distinction was critical because the exploratory drillings gave
the investments "most of their value and all of their lure." Id.,
:at 349. The l:.md itself was purely an mcidental consideration in
ihe transaction,
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common interests and the community atmosphere
make living in a cooperative like living in a small
town. As a rule there is very little turnover in a.
cooperative." Appendix, at 162ar-166a.
Nowhere does the Bulletin seek to attract inve::;tors by
the prospect of profits resulting from the efforts of the·
promoters or third parties. On the contrary, the Bulletin
repeatedly emphasizes the "nonprofit" nature of the endeavor. It explains that if rental charges exceed expenses the difference will be returned as a rebate, not
invested for profit. It also informs· purchasers that they
will be unable to resell their apartments at a profit since·
the apartment must first be offered back to Riverbay "at
the price . . . paid fo .. it." 18 Jd., at 162a. In short,
neither of the kinds of profits traditionally associated·
with securities were offered to respondents.
The Court of Appeals recognized that there must be
an expectation of profits for these shares to be securities,
and conceded that there is "no possible profit on a resale
of [this] stock." 500 F. 2d, at 1254. The court correctly noted, however, that profit may be derived from·
the income yielded by an investment as well as from
capital appreciation, and then proceeded to find "an
expectation of 'income' in at least three ways." Ibid;
Two of these supposed sources of income or profits may
be disposed of summe,rily. We turn first to the Court
of Appeals' reliance on the deductibility for tax purposes
of the portion of the monthly rental charge applied t(}
18

This requirement effectively ins-ures that no apartment will be
sold for more than its original cost. Consonant with the purposes
of the M1tcheli-Lama Act, whenever there are pro~pect1ve buyer&
willmg to pay as much as the imtial purchase pnce for an
apartment in Co-Op City, Riverbay will repurchaRe the apartment
and resell it at its original cost. See Append1x, at 138a. If, for
some reason, Riwrbay does not purchase the apartment the tenant
$tlll cannot make a profit on hi.S sale. See pp. 3-4, supra;
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interest on the mortgage. We know of no basis in law
for the view that the payment of interest, with its con~
sequent deductibility for tax purposes, constitutes income or profits.19 These tax benefits are nothing more
than that which 1s available to any homeowner who pays
interest on his mortgage. See Internal Revenue Code,
26 U. S. C. § 216; Ecksteir" v. United States, 452 F. 2d
1036 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
The Court of Appeals also found support for its concept of profits in the fact that Co-Op City offered space
at a cost substantially below the going rental charges
for comparable housing. Again, this is an inappropriate
theory of "profits" that we cannot accept. The low
rent derives from the substantial financial subsidies provided by the State of New York. This benefit cannot be
liquidated into cash; nor does it result from the managerial efforts of others. In a real sense, it no more
embodies the attributes oi income or profits than do welfare benefits, food stamps or other govP-rnment subsidies.
The final source of profit relied on by the Court of
Appeals was the possibility of net income derived from
the leasing by Co-Op City of commercial facilities, professional offices and parking spaces, and its operation
of community washing machines. The income, if any,
from these conveniences, all located within the common
areas of the housing project, is to be used to reduce
tenant rental costs. Conceptually, one might readily
agree that net income from the leasing of commercial
and professional facilities is the kind of profit tra10

Even if these tax deductions were considered profits, they would
not be the type associated with a security investment since they do
not result from the managerial efforts of others. See Rosenbaum,
The Resort Condominium and the Federal Securities Law-A Case
Study in novernmrntal Inflrx1bility, 60 Va. L Rev. 785, 795-796(1974) , Ca~enote, 62 Geor!,!;etown L. Rev 1515, 1524-1526 (1974) .
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ditionally associated with a security investment. 20 See
Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra. But in the present case
this income-if indeed there is any-is far too speculative and insubstantial to bring the entire transaction
within the Securities Acts.
Initially we note that the prospect of such income as
a means of offsetting rental costs is never mentioned in
the Information Bulletin. Thus it is clear that investors
were not attracted to Co-Op City by the offer of these
potential rental reductions. See Joiner, supra, 320 U. S.,
at 353. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that
the facilities in fact return a profit in the sense that the
leasing fees are greater than the actual cost to Co-Op
City of the space rented. 21 The short of the matter is
that the stores and services in question were established
not as a means of returning profits to tenants, but for
the purpose of making essential services available for the
residents of this enormous complex. 22 By statute these
facilities can only be "incidental and appurtenant" to the
The "income" derived from the rental of parking spaces and the
operation of washing machines clearly was not profit for respondents since these facilities were provided exclusively for the use of
tenants. Thus when the income collected from the use of these
facilities exceeds the cost of their operation the tenants simply
rect:ive the return of the mitial overcharge in the form of a rent
rebate. Indeed, it could be argued that the "income" from the
commercial and professional facilities is also, in effect, a rebate on
the cost of goods and services purchased at these facilities since it
appears likely that they are patronized almost exclusively by Co-Op
City residents. See Casenote 53 Tex. L. Rev. 623, 63{}-631 n. 38
(1975).
2 1 The Court of Appeals quoted the gross rental income received
from these facilities. But such figures by themselves are irrelevant
since the record does not indicate the cost to Co-Op City of providing and maintaining the rented space.
20

22

Sre generally Miller, CoopPrativf.' Apartment:s . Heal Estate

Secuntie:s? 4.5B. U L Rev.464,500 (1965) .

ox·
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housing project. N. Y. Private Housing Law § 12 (5)'
(McKinney Supp. 1974-1975) . Undoubtedly they make
Co-Op City a more attractive housing opportunity, but
the possibility of some rental reduction is not an uexpectation of profit" in the sense found necessary in Howey. 23
There is no doubt that purchasers in this housing
cooperative sought to obtaiP a decent home at an attractive price. But that type of economic interest characizes every form of commercial dealing. What distinguishes a security transaction-and what is absent
Respondents urge us to abandon the element of profits in the
definition of securities and to adopt the "risk capital" approach
articulated by the California Supreme Court in Silver Hills Country
Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P. 2d 906 (1961). Cf. El
Khadem v. Equity Securities Co.rp ., 494 F. 2d 1224 (CA9 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U. S. 900 (1974) . See generally Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security" : Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 Case W. Res. L. RcY. 367 (1967); Long, An Attempt to
Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities
Regulation, 24 Okla. L. Rev. 135 (1971); Hannan & Thomas,
The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal
Securities, 25 Hast. L. Rev . 219 (1973). Even if we were inclined
to adopt such a "risk capital" approach we would not apply it in
the present case. Purchasers of apartments in Co-Op City take no
risk in any significant sense. If dissatisfied with their apartments,
they may recover their mit1al investment m full. See n. 5, supra.
Respondents assert that if Co-Op City becomes bankmpt they
stand to lose their whole investment. But, in view of the fact
that the State has financed over 92% of the cost of construction
and carefully regulates the development and operation of the project,
bankmptcy in the normal sense is an unrealistic possibility. In
any event, the risk of insolvency of an ongoing housing cooperative
"differ[s] vastly" from the kind of risk of "fluctuating" value·
associated with securities investments. SEC. v. Variable Annuity
Life Insurance Co., 359 U. S. 65, 90-91 (1959·) (BRENNAN, J., con~
cur ring) . See Hannan & Thomas, supra, at 242-249; Long, Intro·
duction to Symposium: Interpreting The Statutory Definition of a
Security : Some Pragmatic Considerations, 6 St. Mary's L. J. 96,.
126-128 (1974).
23
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here-is an investment where one parts with his money
in the hope of receiving profits from the efforts of others,
and not where he purchases a commodity for personal
consumption or living quarters for personal use.24
The SEC has filed an amicus brief urging us to hold the federal
securities laws applicable to this case. Traditionally the views of
an agency charged with administering the governing statute would
be entitled to considerable weight. See, e. g., United States National Association of Securities Dealers,- U.S.- (1975) (slip op.,
at 22); Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U. S. 65, 74 (1974); Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S. 617, 626-627 (1971) . But in this
case the SEC's position flatly contradicts what appears to be a rather
careful statement of the Commission's views in a recent release.
In Release No. 33-5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (Jan. 18, 1973), applicable to "the sale of condominium units and other units in a real
estate development," the SEC stated its view that only those real
estate investments that are "offered and sold with emphasis on the
economic benefits to the purchaser to be derived from the managerial efforts of the promot~r, or a third party designated or
arranged for by the promoter," are to be considered securities. Id.,
at 1736. In particular, the Commission explained that the Securities Acts do not apply when "commercial facilities are a part of the
common elements of a residPntial project" if
"(a) the income from such facilities ie. used only to offset common area
expenses and (b) the operation of such facilities is incidental to the
project as a whole and are not established as a primary income
source for the individual owners of a condominium or cooperative
unit." Ibid.
See also SEC Real Estate Advisory Committee Report 74-91
(1972); Dickey & Thorpe, Federal Security Regulation of Condcminium Offerings, 19 N. Y. L. F . 473 (1974) .
Several commentators have noted the inconsistency between the
SEC's position in the above release and the decision by the Court of
Appeals in this case, which the SEC now supports. See Berman
& Stone, Federal Securities Law and t.he Sale of Condominiums,
Homes and Homesites, 30 Bus. Law. 411, 42G-425 (1975) ; Note,
Condominium Regulation : Beyond Disclosure, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev.
639, 654-655 (1975); Casenote, supra, n. 20, at 628. In view of this
unexplained contradictwn m the Commission's position wt> accont
no special weight to its views. See Reliance Electric Co . v. Emerson
24
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III
In holding that there is no federal jurisdiction, we
do not address the merits of respondents' allegations of
fraud. Nor do we indicate any view as to whether the
type of claims here involved should be protected by federal regulation. 25 We decide only that the type of
transaction before us, in which the purchasers were interested in acquiring housing rather than making an
investment for profit, is not within the scope of the fed-eral securities laws.
Electric Co., 404 U. S. 418, 426 (1972); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores,- U.S.- (1975) (slip op., at 22-23, n. 10)
·26 It has been suggested that the sale of housing developments
such as condominiums and cooperatives is in need of federal regula~
tion and therefore the securities laws should be construed or
amended to reach these transactions. See, e. g., Note, Federal s~
curities Regulations of Condominiums: A Purchaser's Perspective, 62
Georgetown L. J. 1403 (1974); Note, Cooperative Housing Corporations and the Federal Securities Laws, 71 Colurr.. L. Rev. 118 (1971).
Others have disagreed, claiming that the extensive body of regulation developed over more than four decades under these Acts would
be inappropriate and unduly costly to the sellers and buyers of residential housing. See Berman & Stone, supra, n. 24; Casenote, supra,
n. 20. Moreover, extension of the securities Jaws to real estate
transactions would involve important questions as to the appropriate
balance between state and federal responsibility. The determination
. of whether and in what manner federal regulation may be reqUired
for housing transactions, where the characteristics of an investment
in securities are not present, is better left to the Congress, which can
assess both the costs and benefits of any such regulation. Indeed
only recently Congress instructed the Secretary of Housmg and
Urban Development "to conduct a full and complete investigation
and study . . . with respect to .. the problems, difficulties and
abuses or potential abuses applicable to condominium and cooperative housing." Pub. L. 93-383, 88 Stat. 740 (Aug. 22, 1974). See
also Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, Pub. L . No. 93-533
(DE'c. 22, 1974) ; InterstatE' Land SalE'l:l FulL Disclosure Act, 15·
v. s. c. §§ 1701- 1720.
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Since respondents' claims are not cognizable in federal
court, the District Court properly dismissed their complant.26 The judgment below is therefore
Reversed.
MR. JtrSTICE DouGLAS took no part in the consideration or dec1sion of this case.

·26 Besides the Securities Acts claims, respondents also included
a vague and conclusory allegation under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against
petitioner, the New York State Housing Finance Agency. We
agree with the District Court that this count must also be dismissed .
See n. 9, supra. The remaining counts in the complaint were all
predicated on alleged violations of state law, not independently cognizable in federal court.

1'0'1'1!1: 'Wbere tt ts feutble, a e:rttabua (headnote) wtt1 be re1eaeed, ae Ia being done In connection with thle caae, at the time
the opinion Ia Issued. Tbe syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion
of the Court but bas been prepared by tbe Reporter of Declslone for
the convenience of the reader. See Un~fed Bfofea v. DefroU Lll•lltr
Oo., 200 U.S. 321, 337.
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UNITED HOUSING FOUNDATION, INC.,
FORMAN ET AL.

ET AL.

v.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 74-157. Argued April 22, 1975-Decided June 16, 1975*
Respondents are 57 residents of Co-op City, a massive cooperative
housing project in New York City, organized, financed, and
constructed under the New York Private Housing Finance Law
(Mitchell-Lama Act). They brought. this action on behalf of all
the apartment owners and derivatively on behalf of the housing
corporation, alleging, inter alia, violations of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and of the Securities Ex~
change Act of 1934 (hereafter collectively Securities Acts), in
connection with the sale to respondents of Rhares of the common
stock of the cooperative housing corporation. Citing substan~
tial increases in the tenants' monthly rental charges as a result
of higher construction costs, respondents' claim centered on a
Co-op City Information Bulletin issued in the project's initial
st::-.ges, which allegedly misrepresented that the developers would
absorb future cost mcreasc::s due to such factors as inflation.
Under the Mitchell-Lama Act, which was designed to encourage
private developers to build low-cost cooperative housing, the
State provides large, long-ter'll low-interest mortgage loans and
substantial tax exemptions, conditioned on step-by-step state
supervision of the cooperative's development. Developers must
agree to operate the facilities "on a nonprofit basis" and may
lease apartments to only state-approved lessees whose incomesare below a. certain level. The corporate petitioners in this case
built. promoted, and presently control Co-op City: United Housing Foundation (UHF) , a nonprofit membership corporation, in"'Together with No . 74-647, New York et al. v. Forman et al.,.
1.1lso on certiorari to the same court.

II-

UNITED HOUSING FOUNDATION, IN'C. v. FORMAN
Ryllalm~

Hiatrd and ~ponsorrd tl1r pro,irrt; Riverbay, a nonprofit cooperative hou~ing corporation, wai< orll'nnizrd b~· UHF to own and
operatr thr land and bmlding~ and iKsue the stork that is the
subjrct of thr in~tant action, and Community Srcuritirs, Inc.
(CSI) , UHF'i< wholly ownrd ~ub~idiary, was thr project 's general
contractor and ~alr~ agrnt. To ll('quire a Co-op City apartment
a prospective purchaser must bu~· 18 shnres of Riverbay stock
for rach room desired at $25 per shnrr. The shares eannot be
transfrrred to a nontcnnnt, plrdged, encumbered, or bequeathed.
(except to a ~urviving spouse), and do not. convey voting rights
based on the number owned (the residents of each npartment
having one vote) . On termination of occupancy a tenant must
offer his stock to Hiverbay at $25 per share, and in the unhkely
event that Riverbay does not repurchase, the tenant cannot sell
his shares for more than their original price, plus a fraction of
the mortgage amortization that he has paid during his tenancy,
and then only to a prospective tenant satisfying the statutory
income elig1bility requirements. Under the Co-op City lease
arrangement the res1dent is committed to make monthly rental
payments in accordance with the size, nature, and location of
the apartment. The Srcurities Acts define a "seclJfity" as
"any ... stock, ... inve~tment contract, ... or, in general, any
instrument commonly known as a 'security.' " Petitioners moved
to dism1ss the complamt for lack of federal jurisdiction, maintaining that the Riverbay stock did not constitute securities as
thus defined. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals reversed, holdmg that (1) since the
shares purchased were called "stock" the definitional srctions of
the Securities Acts were literally appltcablP and (2) the transaction was an investment contract under the Securities Acts,
there being a profit expectation from rental reductions resulting
from (i) the income produced by commercutl facilitieo; established
for the use of Co-op C1ty tenants; (ii) tax deductions for the
portion of monthly rental charges allocable to interest payments
on the mortgage, and (iii) savmgs basE-d on the fact that Co-op
City apartments co"t sub~tantmlJ~r le:;s than comparable nonsubsidized housing. Held The ~han'~ of stock involved in this
litigation do not conshtut(' "secunhet;'· w1thm the purview of the
Securities Acts, and since respondents' claimt-1 are not cognizablA
in federal court, the D1Rtnct Court properly dismissed their•complaint. Pp. 8-18
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(a) When viewed as they must be in terms of their substance
(the economic realities of the transaction) rather than their form,
the instruments involved hrre were not shares of stock in the
ordinary sense of conferring the right to receive "dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits," Tcherepnin v. Knight,
389 U. S. 332, 339, with the traditional characteristics of being
negotiable, subject to pledge or hypothecation, conferring voting
rights proportional to the number of shares owned, and possibility of appreciating in value. On the contrary, these instruments were purchased not for making a profit, but for acquiring
subsidized low-cost housing. Pp. 8-12.
(b) A share in Riverbay does not constitute an "investment
contract" as defined by the Securities Acts, a term which, like
the term "any instrument commonly known as a security," involves investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the et!trepreneurial
or managerial efforts of others. Here neither of the kinds of
profits traditionally associated with securities were offered to
respondents; instead, as indicated in the Information Bulletin,
which stressed the "non-profit" nature of the project, the focus
was upon the acquisition of a place to Jive. Pp. 12-15.
(c) Deductibility for tax purposes of ~he portion of rental
charges applied to interest on the mortgage (benefits generally
available to horne mortgagors) are not "profits," and, in any
event, do not derive from the efforts of third parties. Pp. 15-16.
(d) Low rent attributable to state financial subsidies no more
embodies income or profit attributes than other types of government subsidies. P. 16.
(e) Such income as might derive from Co-op City's leasing of
commercial facilities within the housing project to be used to
reduce tenant rentals (the prospect of which was never mentioned
in the Information Bulletin) is too speculative and insubstantial
to bring the entire tran~action within the Securities Acts. These
facilities were established, not for profit purposes, but to make
essential services available to residents of the huge complex.
Pp. 16-18.
500 F. 2d 1246, reversed.
PowELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BuRGEit,
C. J., and STEWART, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ.,
joinPd. BRENNAN, J ., filed a dissenting opinion, m which DouGLAS
and WHI'l'E, .TJ., joined.

NOTICE: Thle opinion Ia subject to formal revision before publication
In the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Renders are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the
United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of nny typographical or other
formal errors, In order that corrections may be made before the preliminary prln t goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 74-157

AND

74-647

United Housing Founds,..
tion, Inc., et al.,
Petitioners,
74-157
v.
On Writs of Certiorari to the
Milton Forman et al.
United States Court of
State of New York and the
Appeals for the Second
New York State HousCircuit.
ing Finance Agency,
Petitioners,
74-647
v.
Milton Forman et al.
[June 16, 1975]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The issue in this case is whether shares of stock en·
titling a purchaser to lease an apartment in Co-Op City,
a state subsidized and supervised nonprofit housing co·
operative, are "securities" within the purview of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.
I
Co-Op City is a massive housing cooperative in New
York City. Built between 1965 and 1971, it presently
houses approximately 50,000 people on a 200-acre site
containing 35 high rise buildings and 236 town houses.
The project was organized, financed, and constructed
under the New York State Private HQusing Finance Law90
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commonly known as the Mitchell-Lama Act, enacted to
ameliorate a perceived crisis in the availability of decent
low-income urban housing. In order to encourage private developers to build low-cost cooperative housing,
New York provides them with large long-term, lowinterest mortgage loans and substantial tax exemptions.
Receipt of such benefits is conditioned on a willingness to have the State review virtually every step in
the development of the cooperative. See N. Y. Private
Housing Finance Law§§ 11-37, as amended, (McKinney
Supp. 1974-1975) . The developer also must agree to
operate the facility "on a nonprofit basis," id., at § 11-a
(2a), and he may lease apartments only to people whose
incomes fall below a certain level and who have been
approved by the State.1
The United Housing Foundation (UHF), a nonprofit
membership corporation established for the purpose of
"aiding and encouraging" the creation of "adequate, safe
and sanitary housing accommodations for wage earners
and other persons of low and moderate income," 2 Appendix, at 95a, was responsible for initiating and sponsoring
the development of Co-Op City. Acting under the
Mitchell-Lama Act, UHF organized the Riverbay Corporation (Riverbay) to own and operate the land and
buildings constituting Co-Op City. Riverbay, a nonprofit cooperative housing corporation, issued the stock
that is the subject of this litigation. UHF also con1 Eligibility is limited to families whose monthly income does not
exceed six times the monthly rental charge (or for families of four
or more, seven times the rent'tl charge) . N. Y. Private Housing·
Finance Law § 31 (2) (a) (McKinney Supp. 1974-1975) . Preference
in admission must be given to veterans, the handicapped, and th&
eWerly. I d., at § 31 (7)-(9) .
2 UHF is composed of labor unions, housing cooperatives, and'.
civic groups. It has sponsorro the construction of several major·
ho1:1sillg cooperatives m New York City.
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tracted with Community Services, Inc. (CSI), its wholly
owned subsidiary, to serve as the general contractor and
sales agent for the project.8 As required by the Mitchell~
Lama Act, these decisions were approved by the State
Housing Commissioner,
To acquire an apartmP-nt in Co-Op City an eligible
prospective purchaser must buy 18 shares of stock in
Riverbay for each room desired. The cost per share
is $25, making the total cost $450 per room, or $1,800
for a four-room apartment, The sole purpose of acquiring these shares is to enable the purchaser to
occupy an apartment in Co-Op City; in effect, their
purchase is a recoverable deposit on an apartment. The
shares are explicitly tied to the apartment: they cannot
be transferred to a nontenant; nor can they be pledged
or encumbered; and they descend, along with the apart~
ment, only to a surviving spouse. No voting rights attach to the shares as such : participation in the affairs of
the cooperative appertains to the apartment, with the
residents of each apartment being entitled to one vote
irrespective of the number of shares owned,
Any tenant who wants to terminate his occupancy, or
who is forced to move out/ must offer his stock to River·
bay at its initial selling price of $25 per share. In the extremely unlikely event that Riverbay declines to repurchase the stock, 5 the tenant cannot sell it for more than

•

8 CSI is a business corporation that has acted as the contractor
on several UHF-sponsored housing cooperatives.
~ A tenant can be forced to move out if he violates the provisions
of his "occupancy agreement," which is essentially a lease for the
apartment, or if his income grows to exceed the eligibility standards.
5 To date every family that has withdrawn from Co-Op City has
received back its initial payment in full. Indeed, at the time this
suit was filed there were 7,000 families on the waiting list for apart.
ments in this cooperative. In addition, a special fund of nearbl
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the initial purchase price plus a fraction of the portion
of the mortgage that he has paid off, and then only to a
prospective tenant satisfying the statutory income eligibility requirements. SeeN. Y. Private Housing Finance
Law § 31-a (McKinney Supp. 1974-1975) .
In May 1965, subsequent to the completion of the
initial planning, Riverbay circulated an Information
Bulletin seeking to attract tenants for what would someday be apartments in Co-Op City. After describing the
nature and advantages of cooperative housing generally
and of Co-Op City in particular, the Bulletin informed
prospective tenants that the total estimated cost of the
project, based largely on an anticipated construction contract with CSI, was $283,695,550. Only a fraction of this
sum, $32,795,550, was to be raised by the sale of
shares to tenants. The remaining $250,900,000 was to
be financed by a 40-year low-interest mortgage loan from
the New York Private Housing Finance Agency. After
construction of the project the mortgage payments and
current operating expenses would be met by monthly
rental charges paid by the tenants. While these rental
charges were to vary, depending on the size, nature, and location of an apartment, the 1965 Builetin
estimated that the "average" monthly cost would be
$23.02 per room, or $92.08 for a four-room apartment.
Several times during the construction of Co-Op City,
Riverbay, with the approval of the State Housing Commissioner, revised its contract with CSI to allow for
increased construction costs. In addit,ion, Riverbay
incurred other expenses that had not been reflected in the·
1965 Bulletin. To meet these increased expenditures,
Riverbay, with the Commissioner's approval, repeatedly
$1 million had been established by small monthy contributions from
all tenants to insure that those wanting to move out would receivefull compensation for their shares"
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secured increased mortgage loans from the State Housing
Agency. Ultimately the construction loan was $125
million more than the figure estimated in the 1965 Bulletin. As a result, while the initial purchasing price
remained at $450 per room, the average monthly rental
charges increased periodically, reaching a figure of $39.68
per room as of July 1974.0
These increases in the rental charges precipitated the
present lawsuit. Respondents, 57 residents of Co-Op
City, sued in federal court on behalf of all 15,372 apartment owners, and derivatively on behalf of Riverbay,
seeking upwards of $30 million in damages, forced rental
reductions, and other 11 appropriate" relief. Named as
defendants (petitioners herein) were UHF, CSI, Riverbay, several individual directors of these organizations, the State of New York, and the State Private
Housing Finance Agency. The heart of respondents'
claim was that the 1965 Co-Op City Information Bulletin
falsely represented that CSI would bear all subsequent
cost increases due to factors such as inflation. Respondents further alleged that they were misled in their
purchases of shares since the Information Bulletin
failed to disclose several critical facts.7 On these bases,
6 As the rental charges increased, the income eligibility requirements for residents of Co-Op City expanded accordingly. See n. 1,

sup.ra.

Respondents maintained that the following material facts were
omitted: (i) the original estimated cost had never been adhered to
in any of the previous Mitchell-Lama projects sponsored by UHF
and built by CSI; (ii) petitioners knew that the initial estimate
would not be followed in the present project ; (iii) CSI was a wholly
owned subsidiary of UHF; (iv) CSI's net worth was so small that
it could not have been legally held to complete the contract within
the original estimated costs ; (v) the State Housing Commissioner
had waived his own rule regarding liquidity requirements in approving CSI as the contractor ; and (vi) there was an additional undis·
closed contract between CSI and Riverbay.
1
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respondents asserted two claims under the fraud pro•
visions of the federal Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934,
15 U. S. C. § 77q (a); 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b), and
17 CFR § 240.10b-5. They also presented a claim
against the State Financing Agency under the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and 10 pendent state law claims.
Petitioners, while denying the substance of these allegations,8 moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that federal jurisdiction was lacking. They maintained
that shares of stock in Riverbay were not "securities"
within the definitional sections of the federal Securitiee
Acts. In addition, the state parties moved to dismiss on
sovereign immunity grounds.
The District Court granted the motion to dismiss.
366 F. Supp. 1117 (1973) . It held that the denomination of the shares in Riverbay as "stock" did not, by
itself, make them securities under the federal Acts. Thet
court further ruled, relying primarily on this Court's
decisions in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S.
344 (1943), and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293
(1946), that the purchase in issue was not a security
transaction since it was neither induced by an offer of
tangible material profits, nor could such profits realistically be expected. In the District Court's words, it was
"the fundamental nonprofit nature of this transaction"
which presented "the insurmountable barrier to [respondents'] claims in th[e] federal court." ld., at 1128.9
a Petitioners asserted that the Information Bulletin warned purchasers of the possibility of rental increases, and denied that it
omitted material facts. They also argued that prior to occupancy all
tenants were informed that rentat charges had increased. In any
event, petitioners claimed that respondents have suffered no damages
since they may move out and retrieve their initial investments in full.
o The District Court also dismissed the § 1983 claim finding that
the "federat securities allegations represent the only well-pleaded
und!'lrlying basi{! for jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act." Id.1
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.
'500 F. 2d 1246 (1974). It rested its decision on two
alternative grounds. First, the court held that since the
shares purchased were called ''stock" the Securities Acts,
which explicitly include "stock" in their definitional sections, were literally applicable. Second, the Court of Ap·
peals concluded that the transaction was an investment
contract within the meaning of the Acts and as defined by
Howey, since there was an expectation of profits from
three sources: (i) rental reductions resulting from the
income produced by the commercial facilities established
for the use of tenants at Co-Op City; (ii) tax deductions
for the portion of the monthly rental charges allocable
to interest payments en the mortgage; and (iii) savings
based on the fact that apartments at Co-Op City cost
substantially less than comparable nonsubsidized housing. The court further rnled that the immunity claims
by the State parties were unavailing. 10 Accordingly, the
case was remanded to the District Court for consideration
of respondents' claims on the merits.
In view of the importance of the issues presented we
granted certiorari. 419 U. S. 1120 (1975). As we con·
elude that the disputed transactions are not purchases of
securities within the contemplation of the federal statutes, we reverse.
at 1132. In view of these rulings the court did not reach the
sovereign immunity claims.
10 The Circuit Court held that the State Agency was independent
and distinct from the State itself and therefore was a "person"
for purposes of § 1983, that both the Agency and the State had
waived immunity under § 32 (5) of the Private Housing Finance
Law, and that the State had also Implicitly waived its immunity by
voluntarily participating in the sale of securities, an area subject to
plenary federal regulation. See Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Alabama
l>ocks Dept., 377 U. S. 184 (1964). In view of our disposition o!
this case we do not reach these issues
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The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77b (1), de..
fines a "security'1 as
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or
other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a 'security,' or any
certificate of interest or participation in, temporary
or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of
the foregoing." 11
In providing this definition Congress rlid not attempt to
articulate the relevant economic criteria for distinguishing "securities" from "non-securities." Rather it sought
to define "the term 'security' in sufficiently broad and
general terms so as to include within that definition the
many types of instruments that in our commercial world
fall within the ordinary concept of a security." H. R.
Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1933). The task
has fallen to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), the body charged with administering the Securities Acts, and ultimately to the federal courts to decide
which of the myriad financial transactions in our so~
ciety come within the coverage of these statutes.
11 The definition of a security in the 1934 Act is virtually identical
and, for present purposes, the coverage of the two Acts may be
.considered the same. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332,
336, 342 (1967); S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (1934).
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In making this determination in the present case we
do not write on a clean slate. Well-settled principles
enunciated by this Court establish that the shares purchased by respondents do not represent any of the
"countless and variable schemes devised by those who
seek the use of the money of others on the promise of
profits," Howey, supra, 328 U. S., at 299, and therefore
do not fall within "the ordinary concept of a security."

A
We reject at the outset any suggestion that the present
transaction, evidenced by the sale of shares called
"stock," 12 must be considered a security transaction simply because the statutory definition of a security includes
the words "any ... stock." Rather we adhere to the
basic principle that has guided all of the Court's decisions in this area:
"[I]n searching for the meaning and scope of the
word 'security' in the Act[s], form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on
economic reality." Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S.
332, 336 (1967). See also Howey, supra, 328 U. S.,
at 298.
The primary purpose of the Securities Acts of 1933
and 1934 was to eliminate serious abuses in a largely
unregulated securities market. The focus of the Acts is
on the capital market of the enterprise system: the sale
of securities to raise capital for profit-making purposes,
the exchanges on which securities are traded, and the
need for regulation to prevent fraud and to protect the
12 While the record does not indicate precisely why the term stock
was used for the instant transaction, it appears that this form is
generally used as a matter of tradition and convenience. See
P. Rohan & M. Reskin, Cooperative Housing Law & Practice
§ 2.01 (4} (1973).
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interest of investors. Because securities transactions are
economic in character Congress intended the application
of these statutes to turn on the economic realities underlying a transaction, and not on the name appended
thereto. Thus, jn construing these Acts against the
background of their purpose, we are guided by a traditional canon of statutory conatruction:
"that a thing may be within the letter of the statute
and yet not within the statute, because not within
its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers."
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143
U. S. 457, 459 (1892). See also United States v.
American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 543
(1940). 13
Respondents' reliance on Joiner as support for a "literal approach" to defining a security is misplaced. The
issue in Joiner was whether assignments of interests in
oil leases, coupled with the promoters' offer to drill an exploratory well, were securities. Looking to the economic
inducement provided by the proposed exploratory well,
the Court concluded that these leases were securities
even though "leases" as such were not included in the
list of instruments mentioned in the statutory definition. In dictum the Court noted that "[i]nstruments
may be included within [the definition of a security], as
[a] matter of law, if on their face they answer to the
13 With the exception of the Second Circuit, every court of appeals recently to consider the issue has rejected the literal approach
urged by respondents. See C. N . S. Enterprises, Inc . v. G. & G.
Enterprises, Inc ., 508 F. 2d 1354 (CA7 1975); McClure v. First National Bank of Lubbock, 497 F. 2d 490 (CA5 1974), cert. denied, 420
U. S. 930 (1975); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F . 2d 689 (CA3
1973). See also 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 493 (2d ed. 19tH)
("substance governs rather than form : . . . just as some things;
which look like r~al estate are securities, some things which look like
~ecurities are real estate.").

,.
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name or description." 320 U. S., at 351 (emphasis supplied). And later, again in dictum, the Court stated
that a security "might" be shown "by proving the document itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond or
a share of stock." !d., at 355 (emphasis supplied). By
using the conditional words "may" and "might" in these
dicta the Court made clear that it was not establishing
an inflexible rule barring inquiry into the economic realities underlying a transaction. On the contrary, the
Court intended only to make the rather obvious point
that, in contrast to the instrument before it which was
not included within the explicit statutory terms, most
instruments bearing these traditional titles are likely to
be covered by the statutes.14
In holding that the name given to an instrument is not
dispositive, we do not suggest that the name is wholly
irrelevant to the decision whether it is a security. There
may be occasions when the use of a traditional name
such as "stocks" or "bonds" will lead a purchaser justifiably to assume that the federal securities laws apply.
This would clearly be the case when the underlying
transaction embodies some of the significant characteristics typically associated with the named instrument.
In the present case respondents do not contend, nor
could they, that they were misled by use of the word
"stock" into believing that the federal securities laws governed their purchase. Common sense suggests that peoH Nor can respondents derive any support for a literal approach
from Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra, which quoted the Joiner dictum.
Indeed in Tcherepnin the Court explicitly stated that "form should
be disregarded for substance," id., at 336, and only after analyzing
the economic realities of the transaction at issue did it conclude that
an instrument called a "withdrawable capital share" was, in sub.
stance, an "investment contract," a share of "stock," a "certificat~
of interest or participation in a profit sharing agreement," and a
"transferable share.''
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ple who intend to acquire only a residential apartment in
a state-subsidized cooperative, for their personal use, are
not likely to believe that in reality they are purchasing
investment securities simply because the transaction is
evidenced by something called a share of stock. These
shares have none of the characteristics "that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security." H. R. Rep. No. 85, supra, at 11. Despite their
name, they lack what the Court in Tcherepnin deemed
the most common feature of stock: the right to receive
"dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits."
289 U.S., at 339. Nor do they possess the other characteristics traditionally associated with stock: they are not
negotiable; they cannot be pledged or hypothecated;
they confer no voting rights in proportion to the number
of shares owned; and they cannot appreciate in value.
In short, the inducement to purchase was solely to acquire subsidized low-cost living space; it was not to
invest for profit.
B
The Court of Appeals, as an alternative ground for its
decision, concluded that a share in Riverbay was also an
"investment contract" as defined by the Securities Acts.
Respondents further argue that in any event what they
agreed to purchase is "commonly known as a 'security'"
within the meaning of thes~ laws. In considering these
claims we again must examine the substance-the
economic realities of the transaction-rather than the
names that may have been employed by the parties.
We perceive no distinction, for present purposes, between an "investment contract" and an "instrument commonly known as a security." In either case, the basic
test for distinguishing the transaction from other commercial dealings is
"whether the scheme involves an investment of
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money in a common enterprise with profit.<~ to come
solely from the efforts of others." Howey, supra,
328 U. S., at 301.13
This test, in shorthand form, embodies the essential attributes that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security. The touchstone is the presence of an
investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entreprenurial or managerial efforts of others. By profits, the
Court has meant either capital appreciation resulting
from the development of the initial investment, as in
Joiner, supra (sale of oil leases conditioned on promoters'
agreement to drill exploratory well), or a participation in
earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds, as in
Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra (dividends on the investment based on savings and loan association's profits).
In such caees the investor is "attracted solely by the prospects of a return" on his investment. Howey, supra,
328 U. S., at 300. By contrast, when a purchaser is
motivated by a desire to use or consume the item purchased-"to occupy the land or to develop it themselves,"
as the Howey Court put it, 328 U. S., at 300-the securities laws do not apply. 16 See also Joiner, supra. 11
15 This test speakg in terms of "profits to come solely from the
efforts of others." (Emphasis supplied.) Although the issue is not
presented in this case, we note that the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit has held that "the word 'solely' should not be read
as a strict or literal limitation of the definition of an investment
contract, but rather must be construed realistically, so as to include
within the definition those schemes which involve in substance, if
not form, securities." SEC v. Glenn Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474
F. 2d 476, 482 (1973), cert. drmcd , 414 U. S. 821 (1973) . We express no view, however, as to the holdmg of this case.
1~ In some transactions the investor is offered both a commodity or
real estate for use and an expectation of profits. See SEC Release
No. 33-5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (Jan. 18, 1973) . See generally
[Footnote 17 is on p. 14]
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In the present case there can be no doubt that investorS
were attracted solely by the prospect of acquiring a place
to live, and not by financial returns on their investments. The Infc,rmation Bulletin distributed to prospective residents emphasized the fundamental nature and
purpose of the undertaking:
"A cooperative is a nonprofit enterprise owned
and controlled democratically by its members-the
people who are using its services....
"People find living in a cooperative community
enjoyable for more than one reason. Most people
join, however, for the simple reason that it is a way
to obtain decent housing at a reasonable price.
However, there are other advantages. The purpose
of a cooperative is to provide home ownership, not
just apartments to rent. The community is de~
signed to provide a favorable environment for family
and community living....
"The common bond of collective ownership which
you share makes living in a cooperative different.
It is a community of neighbors. Home ownership,
Rohan, The Securities Law Implications of Condominium Marketing
Programs Which Feature a Rental Agency or Rental Pool, 2 Conn.
L. Rev. 1 (1969). The application of the federal securities laws to
these transactions may raise difficult questions that are not present
in this case.
17 In Joiner, the Court stated :
"Undisputed facts seem to us, however, to establish the conclusion
that defendants were not, as a practical matter, offering naked
leasehold rights. Had the offer mailed by defendants omitted the
economic inducements of the proposed and promised exploration
well, it would have been quite a different proposition." 320 U. S.,
at 348.
This distinction was critical because the exploratory drillings gave
the investments "most of their value and all of their lure." !d.,
-at 349. The land itself was pure1y an incidental consideration i~
1he transaction.
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common interests and the community atmosphere
make living in a cooperative like living in a small
town. As a rule there is very little turnover in a
cooperative." Appendix, at 162a-166a.
Nowhere does the Bulletin seek to attract investors by
the prospect of profits resulting from the efforts of the
promoters or third parties. On the contrary, the Bulletin
repeatedly emphasizes the "nonprofit" nature of the en~
deavor. It explains that if rental charges exceed ex~
penses the difference will be returned as a rebate, not
invested for profit. It also informs purchasers that they
will be unable to resell their apartments at a profit since
the apartment must first be offered back to Riverbay "at
the price . . . paid for it." 18 I d., at 162a. In short,
neither of the kinds of profits traditionally associated
with securities were offered to respondents.
The Court of Appeals recognized that there must be
an expectation of profits for these shares to be securities,
and conceded that there is "no possible profit on a resale
of [this] stock." 500 F. 2d, at 1254. The court cor~
rectly noted, however, that profit may be derived frorn
the income yielded by an investment as well as from
capital appreciation, and then proceeded to find ~'an
expectation of 'income' in at least three ways." Ibid.
Two of these supposed sources of income or profits may
be disposed of summarily. We turn first to the Court
of Appeals' reliance on the deductibility for tax purposes
of the portion of the monthly rental charge applied to
18
This requirement effectively insures that no apartment will be
sold for more than its original cost. Consonant with the purposes
of the Mitchell-Lama Act, whenever there are prospective buyers
willing to pay as much as the initial purchase price for an
apartment in Co-Op City, Riverbay will repurchase the apartment
and resell it at its original cost. See Appendix, at 138a. If, for
some reason, Riverbay does not purchase the apartment the tenant
still cannot make a profit on his sale. See pp. 3-4, supra.
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interest on the mortgage. We know of no basis in law
for the view that the payment of interest, with its con..
sequent deductibility for tax purposes, constitutes in•
come or profits.19 These tax benefits are nothing more
than that which is available to any homeowner who pays
interest on his mortgage. See Internal Revenue Code,
26 U. S. C. § 216; Eckstein v. United States, 452 F. 2d
1036 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
The Court of Appeals also found support for its concept of profits in the fact that Co-Op City offered space
at a cost substantially below the going rental chargeB
for comparable housing. Again, this is an inappropriate
theory of "profits" that we cannot accept. The low
rent derives from the substantial financial subsidies provided by the State of New York. This benefit cannot be
liquidated into cash; nor does it result from the managerial efforts of others. In a real sense, it no more
embodies the attributes of income or profits than do welfare benefits, food stamps or other government subsidies.
The final source of profit relied on by the Court of
Appeals was the possibility of net income derived from
the leasing by Co-Op City of commercial facilities, professional offices and parking spaces, and its operation
of community washing machines. The income, if any,
from these conve::J.iences, all located within the common
areas of the housing project, is to be used to reduce
tenant rental costs. Conceptually, one might readily
agree that net income from the leasing of commercial
and professional facilities is the kind of profit tra1n Even if these tax deductions were considered profits, they woul<f
not be the type associated with a security investment since they do
not result from the managerial efforts of others. See Rosenbaum,
The Resort Condominium and the Federal Secunties Law-A Case
Study in Governmental Inflexibility, 60 Va. L. Rev. 785, 795-79().
(1974); Casenote, 62 Georgetown L. Rev . 1515, 1524-1526 (1974).

74-157 & 74-647-0PINION
UNITED HOUSING FOUNDATION, INC. v. FORMAN 17

ditionally associated w1th a security investment. 20 See·
Tcherepnin v. Knight, supra. But in the present case
this income-if indeed there is any-is far too speculative and insubstantial to bring the entire transaction
within the Securities Acts.
Initially we note that the prospect of such income as
a means of offsetting rental costs is never mentioned in
the Information Bulletin. Thus it is clear that investors
were not attracted to Co-Op City by the offer of these
potential rental reductions. See Joiner, supra, 320 U. S.,
at 353. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that
the facilities in fact return a profit in the sense that the
leasing fees are greater than the actual cost to Co-Op
City of the space rented. 21 The short of the matter is
that the stores and services in question were established
not as a means of returning profits to tenants, but for
the purpose of making essP.ntial services available for the
residents of this enormous complex. 22 By statute these
facilities can only be "incidental and appurtenant" to the
The "income" derived from the rental of parking spaces and the
o)!>eration of washing machines clearly was not profit for respondents since these facilities were provided exclusively for the use of
tenants. Thus when the income collected from the use of these
facilities exceeds the cost of their operation the tenants simply
receive the return of the initial overcharge in the form of a rent
rebate. Indeed, it could be argued that the "income" from the
commercial and professional facilitieR is also, in effect, a rebate on
the cost of goods and services purchased at these facilities since it
appears likely that they are patronized almost exclusively by Co-Op
City residents. See Casenote, 53 Tex. L. Rev. 623, 630--631 n. 38
(1975).
2 1 The Court of Appeals quoted the gross rental income received
from these facilities. But such figures by themselves are irrelevant
since the record does not indicate the cost to Co-Op City of providing and maintaining the rented space.
:22 See· generally lVTilleP, Coo1)erative Apartments: Real Estate or
S~curi.ties?. 45 B. U .. L. R ev .. 4611, 500 (1965 )..
20

,·
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housing project. N. Y. Private Housing Law § 12 (5)
(McKinney Supp. 1974-1975). Undoubtedly they make
Co-Op City a more attractive housing opportunity, but
the possibility of some rental reduction is not an "expectation of profit" in the sense found necessary in Howey. 23
There is no doubt that purchasers in this housing
cooperative sought to obtain a decent home at an attractive price. But that type of economic interest characizes every form of commercial dealing. What distinguishes a security transaction-and what is absent
23 Respondents urge us to abandon the element of profits in the
definition of securities and to adopt the "risk capital" approach
articulated by the California Supreme Court in Silver Hills Country
Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P. 2d 906 (1961). Cf. El
Khadem v. Equity Securities Corp., 494 F. 2d 1224 (CA9 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U. S. 900 (1974). See generally Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 367 (1967); Long, An Attempt to
Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities
Regulation, 24 Okla. L. Rev. 135 (1971); Hannan & Thomas,
The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal
Securities, 25 Hast. L. Rev. 219 (1973) . Even if we were inclined
to adopt such a "risk capital" approach we would not apply it in
the present case. Purchasers of apartments in Co-Op City take no
risk in any significant sense. If dissatisfied with their apartments,
they may recover their initial investment in full . See n. 5, supra.
Respondents assert, that if Co-Op City becomes bankrupt they
stand to lose their whole investment. But, in view of the fact
that the State has financed over 92% of the cost of construction
and carefully regulates the development and operation of the project,
bankruptcy in the normal sense is an unrealistic possibility. In
any event, the risk of insolvency of an ongoing housing cooperative
"differ[s] vastly" from the kind of risk of "fluctuating" value
associated with securities investments. SEC. v. Variable Annuity
Life Insurance Co., 359 U. S. 65, 90-91 (1959) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). See Hannan & Thomas, supra, at 242-249; Long, Introduction to Symposium: Interpreting The Statutory Definition of a
Security: Some Pragmatic Considerations, 6 St. Mary's L. J. 96..
12(}-128 (1974).
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here-is an investment where one parts with his money
in the hope of receiving profits from the efforts of others,
and not where he purchases a commodity for personal
consumption or living quarters for personal use. 24
24 The SEC has filed an amicus brief urging us to hold the
federal securities laws applicable to this case. Traditionally the
views of an agency charged with administering the governing
statute would be entitled to considerable weight . See, e. g.,
Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U. S. 65, 74 (1974); Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626--627 (1971) . But in this
case the SEC's position flatly contradicts what appears to be a rather
careful statement of the Commission's views in a recent release.
In Release No. 33-5347, 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (Jan. 18, 1973), applicable to "the sale of condominium units and other units in a real
estate development," the SEC stated its view that only those real
estate investments that are "offered and sold with emphasis on the
economic benefits to the purchaser to be derived from the managerial efforts of the promot.er, or a third party designated or
arranged for by the promoter," are to be considered securities. !d.,
at 1736. In particular, the Commission expl&ined that the Securities Acts do not apply when "commercial facilities are a part of the
common elements of a residential project" if
"(a) the income from such facilities is used only to offset common area.
expenses and (b) the operation of such facilities is incidental to the
project a.s a whole and are not established as a primary income
source for the individual owners of a condominium or cooperative
unit." lbia.
See also SEC Real Estate Advisory Committee Report 74-91
{1972); Dickey & Thorpe, Federal Security Regulation of Condominium Offerings, 19 N.Y. L. F. 473 (1974).
Several commentators have noted the inconsistency between the
SEC's position in the above release and the decision by the Court of
Appeals in this case, which the SEC now supports. See Berman
& Stone, Federal Securities Law and the Sale of Condominiums,
Homes and Homesites, 30 Bus. Law. 411, 420-425 (1975); Note,
Condominium Regulation: Beyond Disclosure, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev.
639, 654-655 (1975); Casenote, supra, n. 20, at 628. In view of thi&
unexpiained contradiction in the Commission's position we accord!
oo special we~ht to its vimv&. s~e Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson
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III
In holding that there is no federal jurisdiction, we
do not address the merits of respondents' allegations of
fraud. Nor do we indicate any view as to whether the
type of claims here involved should be protected by federal regulation. 25 We decide only that the type of
transaction before us, in which the purchasers were interested in acquiring housing rather than making an
investment for profit, is not within the scope of the federal securities laws.
Electric Co., 404 U. S. 418, 426 (1972); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores,- U.S.- (1975) (slip op., at 22-23, n. 10).
26 It has been suggested that the sale of housing developments
such as condominiums and cooperatives is in need of federal regulation and therefore the securities laws should be construed or
amended to reach these transactions. See, e. g., Note, Federal Securities Regulations of Condominiums: A Purchaser's Perspective, 62
Georgetown L. J. 1403 (1974); Note, Cooperative Housing Corporations and the Federal Securities Laws, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 118 (1971).
Others have disagreed, claiming that the extensive body of regulation developed over more than four decades under these Acts would
be inappropriate and unduly costly to the sellers and buyers of residential housing. See Berman & Stone, supra, n. 24; Casenote, supra,
n. 20. Moreover, extension of the securities laws to real estate
transactions would involve important questions as to the appropriate
bala,nce between state and federal responsibility. The determination
of whether and in what manner federal regulation may be required
for housing transactions, where the characteristics of an investment
in securities are not present, is better left to the Congress, which can
assess both the costs and benefits of any such regulation. Indeed
only recently Congress instructed the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development "to conduct a full and complete investigation
and study .. . with respect to . . . the problems, difficulties and
abuses or potential abuses applicable to condominium and cooperative housing." Pub. L. 93-383, 88 Stat. 740 (Aug. 22, 1974). See
also Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 93-533
(Dec. 22, 1974); Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15
u. s. c. §§ 1701-1720.
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Since respondents' claims are not cognizable in federal
court, the District Court properly dismissed their complant.2il The judgment below is therefore
Reversed.

Besides the Securities Acts claims, respondents also included
a vague and conclusory allegation under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against
petitioner, the New York State Housing Finance Agency. We
agree with the District Court that this count must also be dismissed.
See n. 9, supra. The remaining counts in the complaint were all
predicated on alleged violations of state law, not independently cognizable in federal court.
26

